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The Wane of Command




This paper investigates how counterterrorism targeting terrorist leaders affects terrorist
attacks. This effect is theoretically ambiguous and depends on whether terrorist groups are
modeled as unitary actors or not. The paper exploits a natural experiment provided by strikes
by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones) ‘hitting’ and ‘missing’ terrorist leaders in Pakistan.
Results suggest that terrorist groups increase the number of attacks they commit after a drone
‘hit’ on their leader, compared to after a ‘miss’. This increase is statistically significant for three
out of six months after a hit, when it ranges between 47.7% and 70.3%. Additional analysis
of heterogenous effects across groups and leaders, and the impact of drone hits on the type
of attack, terrorist group infighting and splintering, suggest that principal-agent problems –
(new) terrorist leaders struggling to control and discipline their operatives – account for these
results better than alternative theoretical explanations.
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1 Introduction
The United States and its partners will defeat terrorist organizations of global reach
by attacking their [. . . ] leadership; command, control [. . . ]
US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003
(emphasis in original)
Targeting terrorist leaders has become a commonly used US counterterrorism policy since 9/11.
According to the US National Strategy for Counterterrorism 2018, “targeting key terrorists” remains
the number one priority action. This policy is also referred to as targeted leader killing or “cutting
off the head of the snake” – implying that if one does so, the body dies. As illustrated by the above
quote, the underlying goal of this policy is to undermine control within terrorist organizations:
ability of terrorist leaders to determine what others in the organization do.
Terrorist leaders are primarily targeted using armed drones, or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. These
unmanned airplanes can surveil and identify individual targets, and kill them. There have been
over 6700 US drones strikes worldwide to date1. Drone technology is spreading rapidly: 28 other
countries have acquired weaponized drones in the last ten years2.
The prominence of targeted leader killing and the proliferation of drones invite the question
whether this policy works to decrease terrorist violence. This paper addresses that research question.
More precisely, it investigates how drone strikes killing terrorist leaders, thereby undermining control
within terrorist organizations, affect terrorist attacks3.
The effect of killing a terrorist leader on terrorist violence is theoretically ambiguous, and de-
pends on whether terrorist groups are modeled as unitary actors or not. Theoretical models that
consider the terrorist group as unitary – as a single organism as the snake analogy would suggest
– predict that killing a leader decreases the capacity of the group to commit attacks, and thereby
terrorist violence (Sandler and Arce, 2003; Powell, 2007).
However, other theoretical models predict an increase in terrorist attacks after a drone hit on
1https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war, accessed 6 January 2020
2New America Foundation, “World of Drones”, 15 March 2017.
3Defined as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political,
economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation”, following the Global Terrorism Dataset.
1
a terrorist leader. A first family of models treats the terrorist group as non-unitary and subject
to problems of control. Principal-agent models by Shapiro (2013) and Abrahms and Potter (2015)
suggest that leader killing undermines control of the new leader over the organization’s operatives,
which could lead to increased terrorist violence if operatives have a greater preference for violence
than the leader. Other families of models also suggest that targeted leader killing may increase (the
frequency of) terrorist violence: terrorist groups may respond to a loss in capacity by substituting
infrequent ‘big’ attacks by frequent ‘small’ attacks, leader killings that result in civilian casualties
may create backlash if they spur terrorist recruitment, and terrorist organizations may commit more
terrorist attacks after their leader has been killed to signal strength.
Ambiguous theoretical predictions leave an empirical question. However, investigating the causal
effect of counterterrorism on terrorist violence empirically is challenging. Although counterterrorism
may well affect terrorist violence, it is equally possible that terrorist violence invites counterterror-
ism.
To overcome this problem, this paper exploits a natural experiment provided by drone strikes
‘hitting’ and ‘missing’ terrorist leaders in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pak-
istan, which is inspired by Jones and Olken (2009) and shares similarities with an analysis by
Abrahms and Mierau (2017). I construct a new dataset of drone strikes targeting terrorist leaders,
executing several cross-checks to safeguard data quality. This dataset captures variation across time
and terrorist organizations. I argue that conditional on a drone strike targeting a terrorist leader,
drone ‘hits’ and ‘misses’ are quasi-random. Drone hits and misses are not statistically significantly
different from one another on an extensive range of characteristics, including pre-trends in terrorist
violence. Narratives of why drones miss also suggest that misses are largely driven by chance. This
enables a difference-in-difference design, investigating changes in attacks by a terrorist organization
before and after a drone hit on its leader, compared to before and after a miss.
Results indicate that a drone hit on a terrorist organization’s leader is associated with an
increase in the number of terrorist attacks by this organization, compared to a miss. Estimates are
statistically significant for three out of six months after a hit, and the increase in terrorist attacks
worldwide varies between 47.7% and 70.3% for these months. This result cannot be explained
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by terrorist organizations ‘speeding up’ the timing of attacks, or by a decrease in the lethality of
attacks. The result is robust to an extensive battery of robustness checks.
The paper proceeds to tests auxiliary hypotheses derived from theoretical models emphasizing
problems of control, capacity, signaling and backlash. It finds more evidence in favour of hypotheses
relating to problems of control than for those derived from alternative theoretical explanations.
After a drone hit on a leader, those types of terrorist attacks for which we have theoretical and
empirical reason to believe that they are not preferred by terrorist leaders increase most. These
include attacks against civilian and private targets, echoing results by Abrahms and Mierau (2017),
but also attacks by operatives that the organization does not publicly claim responsibility for.
Furthermore, the effect of drone strikes on terrorist attacks is stronger for terrorist organizations
and leaders that rely more strongly on central control. Finally, a drone hit is associated with
terrorist infighting and a proxy for group splintering. However, evidence is also found to support
some, but not all, hypotheses derived from signaling models. After a drone hit, some types of
terrorist attacks that send a strong signal about the group’s continued resolve increase, such as
attacks on military targets and attacks the group claims responsibility for.
A considerable number of existing studies investigate empirically the impact of targeted killing
of leaders of terrorist organizations, yet results are mixed. Some authors conclude that targeted
leader killing is effective, because it speeds up the decline of terrorist organizations (Price, 2019)
or diminishes the number or intensity of terrorist attacks (Jaeger and Paserman, 2009; Johnston,
2012). Others conclude that it has no effect or an adverse effect (Jordan, 2019; Mannes, 2008;
Hafez and Hatfield, 2006; Kaplan et al., 2006; Abrahms and Potter, 2015; Abrahms and Mierau,
2017). Existing studies offer several theoretical explanations for success or failure of targeted
leader killing. The former commonly revolve around the importance of leadership for terrorist
groups’ survival and capacity to commit attacks (Jaeger and Paserman, 2009; Price, 2019). The
latter emphasize martyrdom effects, revenge, or the effect of drone strikes on terrorist recruitment
(Kaplan et al., 2006; Price, 2019; Hafez and Hatfield, 2006). Several authors develop theoretical
arguments explaining why targeted leader killing would be effective against some terrorist groups,
but not others, depending on for example their organizational structure (Price, 2019; Jordan, 2019).
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The above studies encounter some combination of three challenges. Most of these studies cannot
empirically distinguish between competing theoretical explanations for their results, and do not refer
to principal-agent theory as a possible explanation. Notable exception are Abrahms and Mierau
(2017), to whom this paper is indebted for pioneering the study of targeted leader killing by drone
in Pakistan from a principal-agent perspective. However, Abrahms and Mierau (2017) only test one
implication from principal-agent theory, that relating to civilian targeting. Empirically, studies of
targeted leading killing struggle to convincingly demonstrate its causal effect. A handful of studies
employ a similar ‘hit-or-miss’ design as in this paper (Johnston, 2012; Abrahms and Mierau, 2017;
Jaeger and Paserman, 2009), but data used lacks either variation across terrorist groups or over
time. Specifically, Abrahms and Mierau (2017), are forced to consider all terrorist groups in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan area as one. Hence, results hinge on the assumption that the probability of
a hit is not related to trends in violence over time or across groups. These conditions could be
violated in many plausible circumstances, and this paper provides evidence that the probability of
a hit indeed displays a strong time trend. Unlike other studies, the present study can control for
trends over time and differences across terrorist groups by including group and time-fixed effects,
substantially improving causal identification.
Hence, this paper contributes to existing literature on terrorism by testing a rich set of predic-
tions from principal-agent theory. Furthermore, it contributes to the literature on targeted leader
killing by using a more rigorous identification strategy.
Finally, this paper contributes the literature on drone strikes by providing evidence on their
medium-term impact on terrorist violence, across geographical areas where targeted terrorist groups
are active. There is a small but growing literature on the effectiveness of drone strikes in Pakistan
(Johnston and Sarbahi, 2016; Mir and Moore, 2019), generally concluding that they decrease ter-
rorist violence in FATA. Johnston and Sarbahi (2016) argue that the week-to-week timing of drone
strikes is quasi-random due to factors such as the weather, and can consequently only investigate
the short-term impact of drone strikes. Mir and Moore (2019) compare areas in FATA where US
drones were and were not allowed to fly over time. Given their empirical set-up, these studies
cannot speak to the impact of drone strikes on violence outside FATA. This effect is arguably the
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more interesting one, as drone strike explicitly target terrorist organizations “of global reach”.
2 Background
This study focusses on drone strikes in Pakistan4. A drone strike is a strike by an Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle, an unmanned airplane with both surveillance and strike capability. Up to September 2015,
when the Pakistani government acquired armed drones, the US was the only actor conducting drone
strikes on Pakistani territory – over 400 strikes to date.5 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
conducts these strikes, with the consent of the Pakistani government until this was withdrawn in
2013 (Byrne, 2016). Drone strikes target terrorist leaders, both high and low level, as well as named
or anonymous militants. There are no confirmed instances of conventional airstrikes by the US in
Pakistan.
All but a handful of drone strikes have taken place in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas
(FATA), an area of Pakistan which borders Afghanistan. Although the Pakistani military conducts
operations in FATA, there has historically been little civilian government oversight. Until it was
merged into an adjacent province in 2018, FATA was administrated outside of the framework of the
Pakistani constitution.6 The region is known as a sanctuary for numerous terrorist organizations,
which operate in Pakistan and transnationally. Al-Qaida and the Taliban are the best-known
organizations.
Terrorist organizations in FATA are prone to splintering. Infighting between three leaders of
the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) led to a split of the organization in 2009 (Crenshaw, 2012).
Pakistani newspaper Dawn regularly reports on the formation of new TTP splinter factions, such
as Jamaat Al-Ahrar7 or Jundullah 8.
There is a fierce and unresolved debate about the number of civilian casualties that drone strikes
4There have been a substantial number of drone strikes in Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen. Data on Afghanistan
(2015-2017) overlaps insufficiently with data on terrorism. Strikes from Somalia and Yemen are excluded as these
virtually exclusively target a single terrorist organization. Given this, country-specific trends cannot be controlled
for and could bias the analysis.
5https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war/pakistan, accessed 17 April 2018.
6International Crisis Group, “Shaping a New Peace in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas”, 20 August 2018.
7Dawn, “TTP commanders form a new spliter group ‘Jamatul Ahrar”’, 26 August 2014.
8Dawn, “TTP claims attack on Rawalpindi Imambargah, three killed”, 18 February 2015.
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cause, which is of limited relevance to this paper, since the main analysis uses data on named leaders
whose relationship to terrorist groups is not disputed. A well-cited study put the civilian casualty
rate at 32% between 2004-2010 (Bergen and Tiedemann, 2011). There are good reasons to doubt
these and other claims. There is a tendency on the part of US officials to assume that all military-
aged male casualties are militants (Byman, 2013), terrorist groups often cordon off the area of a
drone strike and do not allow witnesses that might confirm or deny reports, and Pakistani media
commonly publish unsubstantiated and high civilian casualty counts (Taj, 2010).
Regardless of the actual number of civilian casualties, terrorist organizations can use drone
strikes hitting civilians as a propaganda tool. Al-Qaida propaganda materials portray drone strikes
as causing mainly civilian deaths and as an indication of the US government attitude vis-a-vis
‘ordinary’ Muslims Ludvigsen (2018); Cronin (2013). This dynamic is one reason for Cronin (2013)
to conclude that drone strikes are an unsuccessful counterterrorism policy.
3 Insights from theory and hypotheses
Four families of theoretical models provide hypotheses on how drone strikes killing a terrorist group’s
leader might affect terrorist attacks, through problems of control, terrorist capacity, backlash and
signaling. According to all four of these, it is possible that a drone hit on a terrorist leader is
associated with increased terrorist violence. To empirically distinguish between these theoretical
models, I derive a set of auxiliary hypotheses. An overview of these hypothesis can be found in
Table 1. For a more comprehensive overview of game theory and terrorism, see Sandler (2011) and
Sandler (2015).
3.1 Principal-agent problems and control
This section discusses principal agent theories of terrorist groups. According to such theories,
counterterrorism threatening to expose a terrorist leader may diminish leaders’ control over their
operatives. Depending on the preferences of leaders and operatives, this could increase terrorist
violence.
6
Both Shapiro (2013) and Abrahms and Potter (2015) model terrorist groups as non-unitary
organizations, subject to principal-agent problems. Principal-agent problems arise because leaders
and operatives within terrorist organizations have different preferences regarding how many and
what type of terrorist attacks to commit. Unless the leader can exert control over operatives,
operatives might not act as the leader wants. Control refers to efforts by the leader to determine
the actions of operatives, specifically: (1) communication – the leader telling operatives what to
do; and (2) punishment – the leader penalizing operatives that do not follow orders or rewarding
those that do (Shapiro, 2013).
Counterterrorism that threatens to expose the terrorist leader is predicted to decrease the degree
of control a leader is able or willing to exert (Shapiro, 2013). Engaging in communication and
punishment makes a leader more vulnerable to detection by counterterrorism agencies, so leaders
may opt to exert less control as scrutiny by counterterrorism agencies intensifies. Mir (2018)
illustrates qualitatively how drone strikes affect control within terrorist organizations in FATA: to
avoid detection by drones, leaders eschewed use of communication devices, quit meetings and were
out of contact with operatives for months. A drone strike that hits a terrorist leader plausibly
decreases control more steeply than a drone strike that misses a terrorist leader. The new leader
is likely less capable of exerting control, at least initially. If the new leader were better than the
old leader at exerting control, presumably he would already be the leader. The new leader may
also be less willing to exert control. The old leader evidently revealed enough information about
themselves to be killed by drone. The new leader might not yet have, giving them an incentive to
trade off control for secrecy.
The predicted effect of a decrease in control on terrorist violence is ambiguous: this depends
on the relative preferences of the leader and the operative (Shapiro, 2013). If the operative has a
greater preference for violence than the leader, decreasing the leader’s control within the terrorist
group is predicted to lead to more violence.
There are theoretical reasons to believe that terrorist operatives indeed have a greater preference
for violence than terrorist leaders. The main theoretical argument is that leaders, having had longer
tenure within the organization, know better that particular terrorist attacks harm the group’s
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long-term prospects by decreasing public support (Shapiro, 2013; Abrahms and Potter, 2015).
Such attacks harmful in the long term likely include attacks on civilians (Abrahms, 2012; Fortna,
2015). Alternative theoretical arguments include a selection effect – operatives are selected for their
tendency towards violence whereas leaders have other qualities (Shapiro, 2013) –, or greater benefits
to violence for operatives – for example in the form of pillage or promotion within the organization
(Abrahms and Potter, 2015).
Empirical evidence also suggests that terrorist leaders prefer less violence than operatives, espe-
cially violence against civilians. In a study of over 1,300 individual members of radical groups in the
US, Jasko and LaFree (2019) find that leaders have a lower propensity for violence than followers.
Anecdotal evidence and qualitative case studies suggests a similar pattern. Intercepted letters from
Al-Qaida suggests that its leaders repeatedly admonish subsidiary groups to commit less violence
against Muslim civilians (Crenshaw, 2012). Al-Qaida in Iraq in particular ignored orders to halt
beheadings and other tactics that eventually eroded its popular support base (Price, 2019; Jor-
dan, 2019). Price (2019) details how the imprisonment of a Hamas leader eroded checks on who
could execute suicide bombings, resulting in more attacks. Abrahms and Mierau (2017) provide
a detailed case study of how leaders of the Taliban tried but on various occasions failed to stop
lower level members from perpetrating indiscriminate violence against civilians. The death of TTP
leader Hakimullah Mehsud reportedly sparked a debate within the group about whether civilians
were legitimate targets and terrorist attacks by the TTP spiked (Crenshaw (2012)). Leaders of the
TTP and Haqqani network publicly denied involvement in attacks that members of their respective
organizations likely did commit, including attacks after TTP had signed a peace agreement with
the Pakistani government9 and an attack on a funeral10.
The latter examples illustrate that leaders who cannot exert sufficient control to prevent op-
eratives from executing attacks harmful to the group’s long-term interests, may still try to do
damage-control by not claiming these attacks. See Abrahms and Conrad (2017) for a formal theory
of such strategic credit-claiming.
Principal agent models thus give the following hypotheses. Drone strikes that kill terrorist
9“Baitullah denies role in suicide bombings”, Dawn, 9 February 2007
10“Taliban denies role in Kabul bombing”, Dawn, 12 June 2017
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leaders are predicted to lead to a decrease in control of leaders over operatives (H1.1). A decrease
in control may be expressed empirically by an increase in terrorist attacks on civilian and private
targets (H1.1a); or an increase in terrorist attacks committed, but not claimed by the organization
(H1.1b).
The degree of control leaders exert affects the organizational structure of terrorist groups.
Abrahms and Potter (2015) note that group structure is a standard proxy for leadership control.
Groups with higher degrees of control are more centrally organized, i.e. have more ties between
leaders and operatives. Robustness of central control is one of two defining characteristics in Stani-
land (2014)’s classification of armed group organizational structure. A group with robust central
control has an effective bureaucracy to discipline members and socialize them into the “party line”.
This gives us a further set of hypotheses. Drone strikes undermining control may lead to a change
in organizational structure: if all ties between terrorist leaders and operatives break down, parts
of the group may form splinter groups (H1.1c), or fight among each other (H1.1d). Furthermore,
groups that rely more on central control may be affected more strongly by drone strikes than
groups that do not (H1.2a). If a group has no central control to begin with, control cannot be
further undermined by killing its leader, and we would expect drone strikes to have little effect.
Finally, the effect of drone strikes on violence may be stronger for the first leader killed (H1.2b).
The first leader targeted decided how much information to reveal about themselves prior to the
existence of drones, and it may be too late to hide this information through decreasing control. The
subsequent leader is possibly better able to trade off control for secrecy. Hence, we may expect the
drop in control to be greatest after the first leader of each group is killed.
3.2 Capacity
A drone strike can be considered an example of a proactive counterterrorism policy aiming to
eliminate terrorist capacity: resources needed for the execution of terrorist attacks. Consider a
production function of terrorist attacks. Several resources can be inputs to this production func-




Drone strikes killing a terrorist organization’s leader are related to...
1. Problems of Control
H1.1 . . . a decrease in control by the leader over operatives, as evidenced by:
(a) an increase in attacks by the organization on private and civilian tar-
gets;
(a) Yes
(b) an increase in attacks by the organization’s operatives that the orga-
nization does not claim.
(b) Yes
(c) an increase in the probability of splintering of the terrorist organization; (c) Yes
(d) an increase in infighting; (d) Yes
H1.2 . . . a stronger increase in terrorist attacks for:
(a) terrorist organizations with more initial central control. (a) Yes
(b) the first leader of the organization struck. (b) Some
2. Capacity
H2.1 . . . a substitution by the terrorist organization of high-impact
attacks with low-impact attacks, specifically:
(a) a decrease in the probability of a successful attack; (a) No
(b) a decrease in the number of victims per attack; (b) No
(c) substitution of attacks on military and US targets with attacks on
private and civilian targets;
(c) No
(d) substitution of attacks in Afghanistan and other locations outside Pak-
istan with attacks in Pakistan.
(d) No
3. Signaling
H3.1 . . . an increase in attacks by the terrorist organization that send a
strong signal, specifically:
(a) attacks taking place shortly after the drone strike; (a) No
(b) attacks on military targets; (b) Yes
(c) attacks on US targets; (c) No
(d) attacks by the terrorist organization that the organization claims. (d) Yes




H4.1 Drone strikes targeting a terrorist organization, yet causing civilian
casualties, are related to an increase in attacks by that terrorist
organization or by terrorist organizations generally.
No
maximize the number of terrorist attacks committed subject to their resource constraints. Drone
strikes eliminating leadership tighten this resource constraint, leading to a predicted decrease in
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the frequency of terrorist attacks (see for example Sandler and Arce (2003); Powell (2007)).
However, capacity models considering that terrorist groups may chose between different types
of attacks can predict an increase in the frequency of terrorist attacks as a result of proactive
counterterrorism (Enders and Sandler, 2004). Imagine that terrorist groups maximize the political
impact of their attacks. They can commit some number of low-impact attacks (requiring fewer
resources) or high-impact attacks (requiring more resources). If proactive counterterrorism policies
eliminate terrorist resources disproportionately required for high-impact attacks, terrorist groups
may substitute away from high-impact attacks into low-impact attacks. If the increase in the
number of low-impact attacks is larger than the decrease in the number of high-impact attacks,
the frequency of terrorist attacks increases, despite lower capacity and lower political impact of the
terrorist group.
Hence, capacity models predict that a decrease in terrorist group capacity due to a drone hit
on its leader may lead to a substitution of high-impact with low-impact attacks (H2.1). This could
manifest in more ‘failed’ terrorist attacks, smaller terrorist attacks in terms of number of victims,
or substitution of attacks on military targets and US citizens or attacks abroad, with attacks on
private and civilian targets or attacks in Pakistan.
3.3 Signaling
A drone strike that hits a terrorist leader may introduce uncertainty about a terrorist group’s ability
or resolve to continue terrorist attacks, which in turn may give terrorist groups an incentive to
commit more attacks in the periods after the drone strike by way of a signal. Imagine a government
must decide whether to make concessions to a terrorist group but is uncertain about the resolve or
resources commanded by the terrorist group. Terrorist groups then have an incentive to commit
more or larger terrorist attacks in the period soon after this uncertainty arises, in an attempt to
convince the government of their strength or resolve and induce concessions (Arce and Sandler,
2007; Lapan and Sandler, 1993).
Signaling models thus hypothesize that a drone strike hitting a terrorist leader leads to an
increase in terrorist attacks that send a strong signal (H3.1). The strongest signal arguably consists
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of terrorist attacks which immediately follow the drone strike hitting a terrorist leader, which hit
a ‘hard’ target, such as a military target or a US citizen, and which are claimed by the terrorist
organization. Furthermore, we might hypothesize that these effects are stronger for more prominent
leaders (H3.2): the more prominent the leader killed by drone, the stronger the signal required to
convince others of the organization’s resolve.
Signaling as a theoretical explanation is difficult to empirically distinguish from revenge or
retaliation. If a terrorist group wishes to avenge the death of its leader, the resulting pattern of
terrorist attacks is plausibly similar to that suggested in H3.1 and H3.2.
3.4 Backlash and recruitment
Proactive counterterrorism policies may cause ‘backlash’ if they result in civilian collateral damage,
thereby spurring terrorist recruitment. Conceptually, backlash is distinct from the effect of targeted
leader killing, but in practice the two might be related if operations killing leaders disproportionately
kill civilians. In this respect, drone strikes are distinct from other methods of targeted leader killing
such as special operations, which may present a lower risk of civilian casualties.
Backlash could occur if terrorist organizations use civilian casualties to foment ideological op-
position (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005). Alternatively, Kalyvas (2000) suggests that those facing in-
discriminate violence by the hands of one party to a violent conflict, may protect themselves by
joining the other. If violence is completely indiscriminate, joining does not pose additional risk, but
provides the new recruit with information on when and where such indiscriminate violence might
occur. A fully informed government may still wish to engage in counterterrorism creating backlash,
if it trades off an increase in future attacks for a decrease in current attacks (Jacobson and Ka-
plan, 2007) or if it does not fully internalize the global costs of proactive counterterrorism because
this increases recruitment, but displaces terrorist attacks to softer foreign targets (Rosendorff and
Sandler, 2004).
Backlash need not remain limited to the terrorist organization subject to pro-active terrorism
policies, but may extend to terrorist groups generally. Siqueira and Sandler (2007) provide a model
in which pro-active counterterrorism measures against one terrorist group, triggers reprisal attacks
12
by other groups.
Theoretical models considering backlash predict that drone strikes that hit civilians may lead
to increased terrorist attacks, by the terrorist organization that was the target of the drone strike,
or by terrorist groups in general (H4.1).
4 Data and methods
4.1 Data
This paper uses a newly constructed panel dataset of successful and failed targeted leader killings,
capturing variation across thirteen terrorist groups over a period of twelve years (2004-2015). The
unit of observation is the group-month. Various cross-checks have been carried out to make this
dataset arguably less subject to reporting bias compared to relying on a single data source. Balance
checks substantiate the assertion that drone hits and misses are quasi-random.
4.1.1 Drone strikes
To construct a dataset of successful and failed targeted killings of terrorist leaders, I code 443 narra-
tives about individual drone strikes between 2004 and 2015 collated by the Bureau of Investigative
Journalism (BIJ)11, and cross-check these with data from the New America Foundation (NAF)12
and information on terrorist leaders from the Mapping Militants Project at Stanford University
(Crenshaw, 2012).
For each drone strike reported by the BIJ, I code whether a terrorist leader was targeted and
whether this leader died. The terrorist group(s) the drone strike targeted is also recorded. This
results in 379 strikes for which the group targeted can be determined from BIJ reports,13 including




13The number of drone strikes targeting a group in a particular month - regardless of leader involvement - is used
as a control variable in a robustness check (section 6).
13
The resulting data on terrorist leaders was cross-checked with data from the NAF. This organi-
zation also provides information on terrorist leaders targeted by drone, which is used by previous
studies (e.g. Abrahms and Mierau (2017); Johnston and Sarbahi (2016)). This data has substantial
downsides. The NAF for unknown reasons does not report unsuccessful strikes on leaders between
2012-2015 and is extremely broad-brushed when classifying terrorist groups. For example, the
Afghan Taliban, local (Pakistani) Taliban, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Punjabi Tal-
iban are all coded as ‘Taliban’. This forces authors using NAF leaders data to consider all groups
targeted as a single unit and truncate the data in 2011 (Abrahms and Mierau, 2017), creating
a single short time series. By contrast, coding BIJ narratives results in information on thirteen
different terrorist groups, forming a panel dataset covering a longer period. An overview of these
thirteen groups can be found in Appendix A1. Note that two of these thirteen groups do not exist
for part of the research period.
Cross-checking data between the BIJ and the NAF gives insight in how information from single
data sources might be biased. Although both BIJ and NAF are nonpartisan and construct their
data on the basis of (often the same) reputable news sources, when reading between the lines, the
NAF appears to have a more positive outlook on use of drones than the BIJ. This gives the NAF
a stronger tendency to portray those killed by a drone strike as a leader. I cross-check all named
individuals the NAF classifies as ‘leaders killed’. Deaths of all but one of these individuals are also
found in the BIJ data, within two days of the NAF-recorded data. However, the BIJ does not
always classify these individuals as ‘leaders’.
To mitigate bias in the interpretation of who is a leader, I cross-check data coded with leaders
mentioned by the Stanford Mapping Militants project. US counterterrorism agencies have an incen-
tive to inflate the importance of individuals once they are killed by drone strike, which affects both
NAF and BIJ data, as these are based on strike reports. By contrast, the Mapping Militants project
creates profiles of terrorist groups independent of drone strikes, based on open-source information
it selects to “maximize veracity and reliability”. Names of the group’s leaders are a fixed element
of each profile.
Confirming the suspicion that the importance of individuals is inflated by drone strike reports,
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the ‘leader’ as classified by BIJ is only recognized as such by the Mapping Militants Project for
approximately one third of strikes (45 out of 137). In the preferred specification only the 45 strikes
involving leaders who are considered as such by the Stanford project are coded as a drone strike
targeting a leader. Fifteen of these succeeded in killing the target. Ten leaders were both missed
and hit (see Appendix A3 for details). Results using the BIJ definition, giving 137 drone strikes
targeting a leader, are included as a robustness check.
Note that it is the rule rather than the exception for the death of a leader, especially those
leaders recognized by the Stanford project, to be confirmed by both sources in the US government
and the terrorist organization. Terrorist organizations commonly publish statements about the
death of their leader, put out eulogies, or place online pictures of his funeral. This does not hold
for those marked as ‘leaders’ by the NAF or BIJ only, who are sometimes only identified by some
less-than-unique nickname.
It is possible that a terrorist group has leaders that are not publicly known. These would
not be included in reports by BIJ, NAF or Mapping Militants, which are all based on open-source
information. Drone strikes on these individuals are counted as strikes not involving a group’s leader
in the present analysis. As results are driven by the difference between drone hits and misses on a
leader, this is not likely to bias the analysis.
I supplement the dataset of terrorist leaders with information on the importance of a leader
within a terrorist group. Two metrics are used. First, an indicator equalling one if the Stanford
Mapping Militants Project indicates an individual was ever ‘first in command’ or similar of a
terrorist group. Secondly, the maximum reward amount offered for information on a terrorist
leader by the US Department of State’s Reward for Justice Programme.
The identification strategy of this paper relies on the quasi-randomness of hits and misses:
indeed, there is virtually no evidence that there is a pattern to hits and misses. Table 2 displays the
mean of a large set of variables for group-months with a drone hit and a drone miss respectively,
and the p-value for a t-test of the difference between both. Results indicate that the probability of
a hit is not driven by prior drone activity, Pakistani military action or peace agreements between
the terrorist groups and the Pakistani government, all of which could reveal information about
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Table 2: Difference between group-months with a drone hit and a drone miss
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Mean miss Mean hit p-value difference
Strikes in previous 6 mths 4.867 5.067 0.868
’Hits’ in previous 6 mths 0.200 0.267 0.622
’Misses’ in previous 6 mths 0.333 0.333 1.000
Pak. military action in previous 6 mths 0.333 0.200 0.364
# Pak. military action days in previous 6 mths 3.367 2.133 0.437
Peace agreement in force previous 6 mths 0.467 0.400 0.680
Peace agreement start previous 6 mths 0.267 0.133 0.322
Peace agreement end previous 6 mths 0.133 0.133 1.000
Strikes in next 6 mths 5.100 3.333 0.100*
’Misses’ in next 6 mths 0.267 0.200 0.633
’Hits’ in next 6 mths 0.200 0.267 0.689
Pak. military action in next 6 mths 0.367 0.133 0.108
# Pak. military action days in next 6 mths 3.567 1.200 0.103
Peace agreement in force next 6 mths 0.500 0.267 0.141
Peace agreement start next 6 mths 0.100 0.000 0.214
Peace agreement end next 6 mths 0.100 0.000 0.214
Year 2,010.033 2,012.267 0.001***
Leader reward (M$) 2.433 1.467 0.573
First in command 0.300 0.133 0.229
Total casualties - low est. 12.967 5.600 0.153
Total casualties - high est. 18.167 10.200 0.193
Civilian casualties - low est. 4.633 0.933 0.352
Civilian casualties - high est. 7.467 2.400 0.314
Child casualties - low est. 3.267 0.533 0.407
Child casualties - high est. 3.467 0.533 0.387
Injuries - low est. 3.833 2.333 0.396
Injuries - high est. 5.933 3.733 0.333
Number leaders involved 1.033 1.000 0.486
area==Bajaur Agency 0.100 0.000 0.214
area==Khyber Agency 0.000 0.067 0.160
area==Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province 0.000 0.067 0.160
area==North Waziristan 0.600 0.667 0.672
area==Orakzai Agency 0.033 0.000 0.486
area==South Waziristan 0.267 0.200 0.633
targettype==Vehicle 0.133 0.000 0.145
targettype==Building 0.567 0.467 0.537
targettype==Both 0.133 0.267 0.281
groupid==Al-Qaida 0.267 0.400 0.374
groupid==Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami 0.133 0.067 0.513
groupid==Haqqani Network 0.133 0.200 0.571
groupid==Taliban 0.033 0.067 0.619
groupid==Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan 0.433 0.267 0.288
Observations 30 15
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terrorist leaders and make a hit more likely. Table 2 also finds no evidence that the probability
of a hit is statistically significantly different when Pakistani military action or a peace agreement
might be anticipated. The probability of a hit does not significantly differ by importance of the
leader, number of leaders involved, district, target type or terrorist group. Hits do not cause a
significantly higher or lower number of (civilian) casualties. There is some evidence that terrorist
groups are less likely to be the target of a drone strike after a drone hit on their leaders. Therefore,
all specifications will control for drone strikes not targeting leaders. There is strong evidence that
the probability of a hit increased over time. This highlights the importance of including time-fixed
effects, which will be included in all specifications.
Anecdotally, drone misses seem to be mostly driven by chance. They fall into three broad
categories: drone strikes hitting locations where the targeted leader is not yet or no longer present,
instances when the targeted leader is merely wounded and instances when reports of a leader’s
death are credible enough to be taken up by reputable news sources only for the leader to later
show up alive. To mitigate concerns that misses are underreported, results using an alternative
definition of a ‘miss’ will be presented as a robustness check.
4.1.2 Terrorist violence and other data
Data on drone strikes targeting the thirteen terrorist groups mentioned by BIJ is linked to data
on terrorist attacks by these groups from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). GTD relies on
open source media accounts of terrorist attacks, and attributes terrorist incidents to a group based
on these accounts where possible. Hence, unclaimed terrorist attacks are attributed to a group if
media reports name the group as perpetrator, and ‘lone wolf’ attacks claimed by some terrorist
group are not attributed to this group if open source media accounts judge this claim not to be
credible. GTD also records instances of infighting - terrorists fighting other terrorists.
Relying on open-source reports introduces possible biases, but simulations suggest that the
extent of these biases would have to be substantial to completely drive this paper’s main results.
First, bias could arise if media are more likely to report terrorist attacks by a group in the six
months after a hit on its leader, compared to after a miss. Appendix B.2.1 suggests that, if drone
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hits in fact had no effect on terrorist violence, media would have to report all terrorist attacks
by a group for six months after a drone hit on its leader and only approximately 65% of attacks
after a drone miss, to obtain a single statistically significant coefficient with 95% certainty. The
actual analysis obtains three significant coefficients. Secondly, measurement error might bias the
analysis, as attacks committed by an unknown perpetrator are excluded from the analysis. This may
introduce bias if there is a group-specific time trend in the likelihood that GTD ascribes an attack
to a particular group, that correlates to the probability of a drone hit. Appendix B.2.2 shows that
drone hits are uncorrelated to the logged number of unattributed terrorist attacks. Furthermore,
it gives results of simulations that attribute attacks by unknown perpetrators to the groups in the
main dataset: 88% of simulated regressions still give at least one statistically significant coefficient.
The main dataset is restricted to the thirteen groups subject to drone strikes, because the iden-
tification strategy in this paper hinges on comparing groups that had their leader hit and missed
at different times. Including terrorist groups not subject to drone strikes in the sample does not
contribute to the identification of the coefficients of interest, but does artificially inflate the sam-
ple size and introduces needless heteroskedasticity. Appendix B.5 illustrates that, unsurprisingly,
including all terrorist groups that committed more than one attack in Afghanistan or Pakistan in
the sample does not affect the main results.
To investigate group splintering, I identify all terrorist groups (other than the included thirteen)
in the GTD that ever committed a terrorist attack in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Using a web search,
I code these as having an affiliation to one or more of the thirteen terrorist groups in the drone strike
dataset, or as unaffiliated (see Appendix A.4 for details). These groups have typically committed
a small number of terrorist attacks (median 2), and anecdotally many of these groups are splinter
groups of the main terrorist groups. The first attack by such a terrorist group recorded by GTD is
taken as a proxy for splintering.
Data on peace agreements between the Pakistani government and terrorist groups and Pakistani
military action against particular terrorist groups up to March 2013 was collected by Staniland et al.
(2018).
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the main outcome variables of interest at the group-
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month level. For ease of interpretation, it displays counts of terrorist attacks. In the main analysis
all count outcome variables are logged. Note that the number of observations included in the main
analysis is smaller than that in Table 3, due to the inclusion of leads and lags of variables. Appendix
B.1 plots terrorist attacks and drone hits and misses by group over time. Terrorist attacks fluctuate
strongly over time, and no definitive pattern can be discerned by eye-balling the resulting graphs.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
count mean sd min max
Number of terrorist attacks 1733 5.066359 15.59163 0 175
Unclaimed attacks 1733 2.632429 7.836554 0 75
Claimed attacks 1733 2.383151 8.416812 0 109
% successful attacks 1733 .2776709 .4352409 0 1
Attack in Pakistan 1733 .8072706 3.155664 0 31
Attack in Afghanistan 1733 3.174841 14.64073 0 175
Attack in rest of the world 1733 1.079631 5.432294 0 73
Mean # victims per attack. 1733 1.442927 5.858005 0 139
Attack on private target 1733 1.577034 4.837961 0 47
Attack on civilian target 1733 5.057703 15.56407 0 175
Attack on military target 1733 2.493941 9.398454 0 126
Attack with US victim 1733 .06809 .3579882 0 5
Pakistani military action 1304 .0858896 .2803084 0 1
Peace agreement in force 1304 .2062883 .4047952 0 1
Drone strikes 1733 .2186959 .6421107 0 7
Splintering 1733 .0155799 .1238791 0 1
Infighting between terrorist groups 1733 .0230814 .2267818 0 5
4.2 Empirical strategy










γi,t−kXi,t−k + µi + θt + εit (1)
where subscript t indicates a month and subscript i a terrorist group. Yit is the outcome variable
of interest, most commonly a logged count (ln(count+ 1)) of the number of terrorist attacks. hit is
an indicator equaling one if a group’s leader was targeted by drone and killed. targeted equals one
if a leader was targeted by drone and killed or if a leader was targeted by drone and survived. X
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denotes any group-specific control variables. All specifications unless otherwise indicated control for
the number of drone strikes on a group regardless if they targeted a leader. µi and θt are vectors of
group and month-fixed effects respectively. Standard errors are Newey-West standard errors with
bandwidth twelve, although Appendix B.5 investigates the robustness of results to using different
standard errors and bootstrapping test statistics using randomization inference.
Specification 1 is estimated using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model. As OLS assumes
normally distributed standard errors to determine the level of statistical significance of coefficients,
Appendix B.4 shows that residuals obtained using specification 1 are indeed approximately normally
distributed. Alternatively, negative binomial models are commonly used in the literature to analyze
unlogged counts of terrorist attacks (e.g. Reese et al. (2017)). This is not the model of choice here,
as results from negative binomial models are inconsistent and subject to bias in the presence of a
large number of fixed effects (Hilbe, 2011; Allison, 2012). However, as the extent of this bias in
the present case is unclear, Appendix B.5 also presents alternative results using two fixed effect
negative binomial models.
The individual coefficients on the lags of hit – and the p-value from a Wald test of their joint
significance – are the main coefficients of interest. These reflect the effect of a drone hit on a terrorist
leader, compared to a drone miss.14 In experimental terms, group-months for which hit = 1 and
targeted = 1 are the treatment group, and group-months for which hit = 0 and targeted = 1 form
the control group. The coefficients on the lags of targeted reflect the effect of a drone miss.15
To credibly identify the causal impact of targeted leader killing, the probability of a hit must
not be driven by prior trends in the outcome variable. This would for example be the case if
counterterrorist organizations would accept a higher or lower probability of a hit for terrorist groups
that commit an increasing number of terrorist attacks. To verify the parallel trends assumption,
each specification includes six leads of targeted and hit, in addition to six lags. If the coefficients on
the leads of hit are statistically significant, this provides evidence that the parallel trends assumption





k=−6 γi,t−kXi,t−k +µi + θt + εit where miss is an indicator equaling one if a terrorist group’s leader was targeted
by drone but survived. Coefficients on hiti,t−k from specification 1 are identical to βi,t−k − δi,t−k in the above.
15Coefficients on targeted in specification 1 are identical to the coefficients on miss in the above specification.
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has been violated. p-values for the joint significance of leads of hit will be provided for all regressions.
5 Main Results
Main results suggest that the number of attacks committed by a terrorist group increases in the
six months after a drone strike hits one of its leaders, whereas no change in terrorist violence can
be detected after a strike that targets but misses a leader.
Figure 1 displays the results from specification 1. These results are also reproduced in Table 5,
column 1. It displays the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for six leads and lags of
the variables hit (left panel) and targeted (right panel). It also displays a quadratic trend for the
six lags of hit and its 95% confidence interval. Recall that coefficients on the lags of hit reflect the
effect of a drone hit compared to a miss, that coefficients on targeted reflect the effect of a miss,
and that group and period fixed effects and control variables are included in this specification.
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Results suggest that the number of terrorist attacks increases after a leader has been hit, com-
pared to when he has been missed. This increase is statistically significant at the 5% level for
the second, third and sixth lag of hit and the coefficients on all lags of hit (indicated by t + k)
are jointly statistically significant at the 5% level. The increase in the number of terrorist attacks
is substantial: the three significant lags suggest a respective 47.7%, 70.3% and 52.5% increase in
terrorist attacks globally by a group that had its leader killed by drone, over an average of 7 attacks
per month in the six month after a drone miss. There is no evidence that the trend in the number
of terrorist attacks was already different prior to a hit, compared to prior to a miss: coefficient
estimates on leads of hit (indicated by t− k) are individually and jointly insignificant.
The right panel of Figure 1 suggests that drone strikes that target but miss a leader have no
statistically significant effect on the number of terrorist attacks over the next half year. Coefficients
on all leads and lags of targeted are individually and jointly insignificant.
Further results suggest that the effect of a drone hit on terrorist attacks can be detected up to six
to seven months thereafter. The analysis in Appendix B.7 varies the number of lags of all variables
in specification1 between four and 15. None of the coefficients on hit is statistically significant
beyond month seven in any of the models.
6 Robustness
6.1 Speed-up of the timing of terrorist attacks
The main results presented would not necessarily imply an increase in terrorist attacks overall, if
terrorist groups merely change the timing of already planned attacks after a drone strike has hit
their leader, so that attacks are concentrated in the six months after the strike. I find some evidence
of this, but effects are not statistically significant and too small to explain the main results.
There is no evidence that terrorist groups commit their next attack substantially sooner after a
drone hit on their leader, compared to after a miss (Table 4). If the duration to the first terrorist
attack after the drone strike is decreased, this effect is small: point estimates suggest the first
attack occurs about 13 days earlier after a hit compared to after a miss (column 1). The Cox
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hazard model presented in column 2 similarly suggests that the hazard of a first attack occurring
is not significantly higher after a drone hit compared to after a drone miss.
On a longer time scale, there is some evidence of displacement of terrorist attacks over time,
but this effect is not statistically significant for drone hits on a terrorist leader. Figure 2 displays
results from specification 1, including fifteen leads and lags of all variables. For readability, only
the coefficients on the lags of hit and targeted are displayed, in addition to a cubic trend and 95%
confidence intervals. Results suggest that the number of terrorist attacks is somewhat lower in
earlier and higher in later months after a drone miss, compared to similar periods not preceded
by a drone strike aimed at a leader. Coefficients are significant for month three, ten and thirteen.
Although coefficients on hit follow the opposite trend, there is no statistically significant decline in
the number of terrorist attacks in month eight to fifteen after a drone hit on a terrorist leader, as
we might expect if terrorist attacks planned for later periods were committed earlier in response to
the hit. On average, the fifteen coefficients in the extended model still suggest a 17% increase in
terrorist attacks after a drone hit.16
Table 4: Duration in days to first terrorist attack
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS cox OLS cox OLS cox
First First First First First First
terrorist terrorist claimed claimed unclaimed unclaimed
VARIABLES attack attack attack attack attack attack
Drone strike killing leader -13.15 -0.0505 -41.56 0.354 22.10 0.318
(36.19) (0.283) (32.45) (0.314) (29.67) (0.248)
Constant 61.78*** 99.14*** 20.40
(12.34) (11.06) (10.65)
Observations 44 44 44 44 39 39
R-squared 0.003 0.029 0.058
Number of groups 5 5 4
Group FE YES NO YES NO YES NO
Stratified on group NO YES NO YES NO YES
Clustered (group) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
16This effect is close to half the size of that in the baseline model (36.1%), which is roughly consistent with the
idea that the effect of a drone hit on terrorist attacks is null beyond month seven.
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6.2 Alternative econometric specifications
Main results are robust to including leader-fixed effects, omitting control variables, including several
additional control variables and estimating p-values for lags of hit through randomization inference.
Similar, but somewhat weaker results are also obtained when employing an alternative definition
of ‘leader’. Main results are sensitive to varying which Al-Qaida branches are considered part of
Al-Qaida, but not to other alternative treatments of terrorist groups.
Table 5 investigates the robustness of the main results, which are reproduced in column 1. Only
lags of the variable of interest are presented to promote readability.
Omitting the number of drone strikes targeting a terrorist group as a control variable does not
meaningfully affect the main results (column 2). Results are robust to including leader-fixed effects
(column 3), and to controlling for six leads and lags of an indicator for Pakistani military action
against a terrorist group and the existence of a peace agreement between the terrorist group and
the Pakistani government (columns 4 and 5). The latter two variables are only available up to
March 2013, leading to a substantial loss in observations, so these variables are not included in the
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baseline specifications.
The next columns of Table 5 investigate the sensitivity of main results to alternative ways of
aggregating terrorist groups. The dependent variable for Al-Qaida in the baseline specification is
an aggregation of terrorist attacks by all Al-Qaida branches17. I argue that this is the most appro-
priate set-up to analyse Al-Qaida terrorist attacks for several reasons. First, leaders of several of
these branches are at times present in FATA. Presence of leaders of Al-Qaida in Iraq, Al-Qaida in
the Arab Peninsula and Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent in FATA is recorded by the BIJ.18
Second, Al-Qaida leaders based in FATA at least attempt to control its branches (Crenshaw, 2012;
Shapiro, 2013). Third, reducing attacks by branches is one motivation for drone strikes against
Al-Qaida. The 2018 US counterterrorism strategy explicitly mentions that targeting key terrorists
will “disrupt, degrade and prevent reconstruction of terrorist networks”.19 Nevertheless, column
6 presents results obtained if only attacks by Al-Qaida proper and Al-Qaida in the Indian Sub-
continent are ‘counted’ as Al-Qaida terrorist attacks. Main results are clearly sensitive to this
alternative treatment of Al-Qaida branches. The reader unconvinced by the arguments above may
have to conclude that drone strikes on a terrorist group’s leader do not affect the number terrorist
attacks this group commits. However, considering Al-Qaida branches as independent organizations
affiliated to Al-Qaida only strengthens the results obtained in Appendix C.1 indicating that drone
strikes hitting a terrorist group’s leader increase the number of terrorist attacks committed by this
group’s affiliates.
Main results are robust to recoding ‘local Taliban’ as TTP from December 2007 onwards. GTD
appears to code all terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Pakistan after this date as committed by
TTP, whereas the BIJ distinguishes the TTP from the ‘local Taliban’. This recoding does not affect
the main results (column 7).
17These are: Al-Qaida (30 terrorist attacks over the period under investigation); Al-Qaida in Iraq (637); Al-
Qaida in Saudi Arabia (1); Al-Qaida in Yemen (12); Al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula (907); Al-Qaida in the Indian
Subcontinent (14); Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (248).
18Bureau of Investigative Journalism reports Ob74, Ob177, Ob348, Ob359.
19National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America, October 2018, available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/NSCT.pdf.
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Table 5: Robustness of main results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pak. mil Peace Alt. Alt. Alt.
No action agreem. aggreg. aggreg. leader.
Baseline controls Baseline 6L&Ls 6L&Ls AQ TTP coding
VARIABLES Terr.att. Terr.att. Terr.att. Terr.att. Terr.att. Terr.att. Terr.att. Terr.att.
t 0.298 0.267 0.126 0.386 0.420* 0.0645 0.300 0.220*
(0.191) (0.190) (0.219) (0.239) (0.235) (0.164) (0.194) (0.128)
t+1 0.209 0.114 0.345* 0.338 0.361 0.0722 0.326* 0.184
(0.193) (0.192) (0.195) (0.241) (0.236) (0.166) (0.196) (0.128)
t+2 0.390** 0.351* 0.465** 0.595** 0.608** -0.0849 0.403** 0.434***
(0.191) (0.191) (0.201) (0.251) (0.246) (0.164) (0.194) (0.129)
t+3 0.533*** 0.578*** 0.522*** 0.748*** 0.840*** 0.186 0.529*** 0.209
(0.191) (0.190) (0.194) (0.251) (0.246) (0.164) (0.193) (0.128)
t+4 0.119 0.140 0.130 0.166 0.217 -0.0557 0.134 0.0193
(0.194) (0.193) (0.191) (0.270) (0.266) (0.167) (0.196) (0.129)
t+5 0.0951 0.0550 0.0556 0.397 0.437* 0.0647 0.0501 0.0321
(0.189) (0.188) (0.193) (0.255) (0.251) (0.163) (0.194) (0.129)
t+6 0.422** 0.376* 0.469** 0.529** 0.554** -0.0106 0.409** 0.101
(0.192) (0.192) (0.193) (0.260) (0.257) (0.166) (0.196) (0.131)
Observations 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,148 1,148 1,577 1,492 1,577
R-squared 0.850 0.847 0.860 0.848 0.852 0.861 0.852 0.852
Group FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Leader FE NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
Prob > F lags hit 0.0236 0.0137 0.0111 0.0258 0.0094 0.7231 0.0279 0.0384
Prob > F leads hit 0.6137 0.7885 0.1411 0.1414 0.1348 0.1753 0.3942 0.4063
Prob > F lags targeted 0.8760 0.7764 0.6224 0.6704 0.6045 0.5828 0.5815 0.6574
Prob > F leads targeted 0.2688 0.2747 0.0411 0.0438 0.0441 0.0795 0.3116 0.0849
Control mean 1.9450 1.9450 1.9450 1.9450 1.9450 1.1672 1.9450 1.7937
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
26
Lastly, column 8 presents results when using an alternative coding rule for who constitutes a
terrorist leader. Under this alternative rule, all individuals marked by the BIJ as ‘leader’, ‘comman-
der’, ‘senior figure’ or similar are considered leaders. This coding rule plausibly considers as drone
hits, strikes on some individuals whose status as leader was exaggerated in the media after they
have been hit. Despite this, the second lag of hit remains individually and all coefficients on hit
jointly significant. Although the observed effect is somewhat weakened, which may be unsurprising
if the alternative coding rule counts as ‘hits’ strikes on some individuals who may in reality not
have a leading role, it is still in evidence.
Appendix B.3 suggests that the lack of statistical significance of individual leads and lags of hit
in the main results is not an artefact of small sample size, implying that the first, fourth and fifth
lag of hit, as well as all leads of hit are indeed null. Simulations thus suggest that the sample size
would have to be radically expanded to make a meaningful difference to the main results.
Appendix B.5 furthermore shows that results are robust to: restricting the analysis to periods
within 6 months of a hit or a miss, using a group-time trend instead of period fixed effects, using
Discroll-Kraay standard errors, dropping two small terrorist groups, including all terrorist groups
that have committed more than one attack in Afghanistan or Pakistan in the sample, and restricting
the period under analysis to periods prior to Pakistan acquiring its own drone capability. Results
are also robust to using alternative counterfactuals that are less subject to measurement error. To
investigate concerns that results are driven by trends over time specific to world regions terrorist
groups are active in, Appendix B.5 also shows results from region-group-month level regressions,
including region-fixed effects, region-group fixed effects and region-period fixed effects respectively.
Results are somewhat sensitive to using HAC instead of Newey-West standard errors.
However, calculating the main test statistic using randomization inference leaves results qual-
itatively unchanged (Appendix B.6). As randomization inference necessitates no assumptions re-
garding the distribution of the standard errors, this further mitigates the concern that statistically
significant coefficients in the main result are an artefact of non-normally distributed residuals. Al-
though there are doubts about whether these are consistently estimated (Hilbe, 2011; Allison, 2012),
Appendix B.5 provides results from two fixed effects negative binomial models. In these models,
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most individual coefficients lose statistical significance, but coefficients on the lags of hit are still
jointly significant.
7 Theoretical explanations for main results
This section explores which theory most plausibly explains the main results, by testing the hy-
potheses derived from theoretical models of problems of control, capacity, backlash and signaling
(or revenge). Most evidence found favours problems of control as an explanation, although there is
also some evidence in favour of signaling. Table 1 provides an overview of hypotheses and evidence
found.
7.1 Problems of control
Principal-agent models of terrorist organizations suggest that the main results may be driven by
a loss of control of terrorist leaders over operatives. I find evidence in favour of most hypotheses
derived from theoretical models of problems of control.
The increase in terrorist attacks after a drone hit on a leader is driven by those types of attacks
that leaders plausibly do not favour. Consistent with the idea that terrorist operatives may have
a greater preference for violence against civilians than the leader (H1.1a), the number of attacks
against civilian and private targets is statistically significantly higher after a drone hit on a leader
compared to after a drone miss (Table 6, columns 1 and 2). This result echoes that obtained by
Abrahms and Mierau (2017). Furthermore, the number of unclaimed attacks increases significantly
for three out of six months after a drone hit (column 3). This is consistent with the idea that leaders
may strategically not claim attacks by operatives that they fear will have negative repercussions
for the terrorist group’s long-term goals (H1.1b).
A decrease in control may also be expressed in a change in the organizational structure of
the terrorist group. If all ties between leaders and operatives break down, a terrorist group may
splinter (H1.1c), or operatives may start fighting among themselves (H1.1d). Indeed, a drone hits
is associated with an increase in the third and fifth lag of a proxy for group splintering (Table 6,
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Table 6: Effects on attack type and organizational changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Civilian Private Unclaimed Splintering Infight Claimed
t 0.299 0.499*** 0.0384 -0.0666 0.0186 0.552***
(0.191) (0.163) (0.177) (0.0449) (0.0424) (0.184)
t+1 0.209 0.0963 0.201 -0.0914** -0.00110 0.361*
(0.193) (0.165) (0.180) (0.0448) (0.0424) (0.186)
t+2 0.382** 0.0390 0.343* -0.0663 0.0373 0.271
(0.191) (0.163) (0.178) (0.0448) (0.0422) (0.184)
t+3 0.538*** 0.391** 0.438** 0.0899** 0.159*** 0.655***
(0.191) (0.163) (0.177) (0.0448) (0.0422) (0.184)
t+4 0.119 0.210 0.0254 0.0770* 0.0438 0.273
(0.194) (0.165) (0.180) (0.0448) (0.0424) (0.186)
t+5 0.0883 0.237 0.0692 0.144*** 0.0225 0.201
(0.189) (0.161) (0.176) (0.0443) (0.0418) (0.182)
t+6 0.421** 0.397** 0.519*** 0.00821 -0.0430 0.251
(0.192) (0.164) (0.178) (0.0458) (0.0430) (0.185)
Observations 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,577
R-squared 0.850 0.761 0.807 0.233 0.221 0.765
Group FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Prob > F lags hit 0.0221 0.0803 0.0036 0.0004 0.0122 0.0309
Prob > F leads hit 0.6168 0.2073 0.2383 0.3741 0.0000 0.2199
Prob > F lags targeted 0.8717 0.2355 0.1811 0.0006 0.4976 0.0705
Prob > F leads targeted 0.2580 0.7959 0.5480 0.2973 0.0133 0.4142
Control mean 1.9441 1.0720 1.4810 0.0594 0.0543 1.2292
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
column 4). If the first attack by a small affiliated group in Afghanistan and Pakistan is a credible
indicator for splintering of the parent group, terrorist groups are more likely to splinter after a
drone hit on their leader. Finally, a drone hit is associated with an increase in infighting (column
5). These results should be treated with some caution for two reasons. First, infighting is rare,
there are only forty instances of infighting in 26 time periods. Second, in this specification, leads
of hit are also strongly jointly statistically significant. However, Appendix B.8 shows that this is
driven by a single coefficient, and not necessarily by consistently differing trends between a hit and
a miss prior to the drone strike.
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Table 7: Heterogeneous effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Terr. att. Terr. att. Terr. att. Terr. att. Terr. att. Terr. att.
t -0.102 0.312 -0.109 0.346 0.342 0.242
(0.238) (0.197) (0.229) (0.270) (0.244) (0.218)
t+1 0.119 0.166 0.198 0.189 0.141 0.118
(0.243) (0.199) (0.234) (0.268) (0.246) (0.220)
t+2 -0.249 0.309 -0.0485 0.000654 -0.0862 0.0734
(0.241) (0.197) (0.231) (0.263) (0.246) (0.215)
t+3 0.393 0.448** 0.508** 0.390 0.477* 0.298
(0.241) (0.198) (0.230) (0.265) (0.244) (0.217)
t+4 -0.519** -0.00621 -0.281 -0.196 0.0808 0.0874
(0.243) (0.201) (0.231) (0.272) (0.251) (0.222)
t+5 -0.115 -0.0273 0.0262 -0.0167 0.277 -0.0112
(0.237) (0.196) (0.227) (0.275) (0.252) (0.219)
t+6 -0.206 0.262 0.0564 0.523* 0.271 0.409*
(0.249) (0.199) (0.236) (0.281) (0.268) (0.226)
Interaction 1.247*** 0.381 1.423*** -0.486 0.185 -0.153
(0.393) (0.754) (0.427) (0.403) (0.406) (0.566)
t+1 0.568 0.883 0.516 -0.128 0.599 0.172
(0.401) (0.754) (0.437) (0.401) (0.413) (0.552)
t+2 1.726*** 1.651** 1.543*** 0.513 1.051** 0.983*
(0.402) (0.758) (0.442) (0.407) (0.422) (0.547)
t+3 0.583 1.449* 0.285 0.0600 0.248 0.267
(0.405) (0.759) (0.448) (0.400) (0.416) (0.524)
t+4 1.765*** 1.747** 1.378*** 0.494 0.120 -0.575
(0.407) (0.759) (0.448) (0.404) (0.420) (0.524)
t+5 0.889** 1.647** 0.441 0.192 -0.228 0.227
(0.400) (0.757) (0.441) (0.408) (0.417) (0.506)
t+6 1.779*** 1.858** 1.302*** -0.178 0.455 0.0882
(0.397) (0.760) (0.423) (0.411) (0.412) (0.500)
Observations 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,577
R-squared 0.864 0.854 0.860 0.855 0.856 0.856
Interaction variable central control intregated vanguard 1st hit reward 1st in comm.
Group FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Prob > F lags hit 0.0261 0.0959 0.0632 0.0544 0.3061 0.3373
Prob > F leads hit 0.0991 0.5429 0.2143 0.7520 0.1320 0.4661
Prob > F lags inter. 0.0000 0.1257 0.0001 0.5116 0.1120 0.1616
Prob > F leads inter. 0.0000 0.5751 0.0000 0.7435 0.0143 0.0537
Control mean 1.9450 1.9450 1.9450 1.9450 1.9450 1.9450
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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If the main results of these study are due to aggravated problems of control, we may furthermore
observe heterogeneous effects across terrorist groups and leaders. Specifically, terrorist groups that
rely more strongly on central control may be more strongly affected (H1.2a), and the drop in control
may be largest for the first leader killed, as they were initially not subject to incentives to trade
off control for secrecy (H1.2b). Results on heterogenous effects, displayed in Table 7, should be
interpreted with some caution: given the limited number of drone strikes targeting a terrorist leader
and limited number of groups, statistical power to detect any interaction effects may be lacking.
Keeping this in mind, the first three columns of Table 7 suggest that the effect of a drone hit
on a terrorist leader is greater for terrorist groups that rely more strongly on central control. I
employ a classification by Staniland (2014), in which integrated and vanguard terrorist groups have
strong central control. Staniland considers the Taliban an integrated group (p140). Al-Qaida is not
explicitly classified, but its strategy of making alliances closely resembles Staniland’s description
of a vanguard group (p44-46). No other groups subject to drone hits and misses on their leaders
are classified by Staniland as having strong central control20. Column 1 reveals that the effect of
a drone hit on terrorist attacks is indeed stronger for these two organizations. This heterogeneous
effect holds both for the Taliban, the one integrated organization (column 2), and for Al-Qaida, the
only vanguard organization (column 3).
Lastly, column 4 of Table 7 provides some very tentative support for the hypothesis that the
effect of a drone hit is stronger for the first leader hit. Coefficients on the second to fifth lag of the
interaction term are positive and of substantial size compared to their non-interacted counterparts.
They are not individually or jointly statistically significant however.
7.2 Capacity
There is no evidence that terrorist groups, in response to a drone strike hitting their leader, substi-
tute a small number of high-impact attacks with a large number of low-impact attacks, as capacity
models would suggest (H2.1).
20TTP is classified as a Parochial group (p.6), the Stanford mapping militants project describes Harkat-ul-Jihad-
al-Islami as consisting of “small, autonomous cells”, not suggesting strong central control and the Haqqani network
is described by Staniland as a group with “strong social ties’ (p.138).
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A low-impact attack might be an ‘unsuccessful’ terrorist attack, i.e. the planned attack type was
foiled, or an attack with a small number of victims (H2.1a and H2.1b respectively). Table 8 provides
no evidence that these attack types increase after a drone hit on a terrorist leader. If anything, the
percentage of ‘successful’ terrorist attacks (column 1) and the mean number of victims per terrorist
attack (column 2) is lower for some individual months after a hit.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that terrorist groups substitute attacks against ‘softer’ targets
for attacks against ‘hard’ targets (H2.1c). Even though the number of attacks against civilian or
private targets does increase (Table 6), Table 8 shows no significant decline in the number of terrorist
attacks against military targets (column 3) or attacks with US casualties or injured (column 4).21
Finally, Table 8 provides no evidence that terrorist groups are concentrating their attacks in
their ‘homebase’ of Pakistan at the expense of attacks in Afghanistan or the rest of the world
(excluding Western Europe, the US and Australia) after a drone hit on their leader (H2.1d). In
fact, the main results are driven by terrorist attacks in the rest of the world (ROW, column 5)22.
Although it would be interesting to investigate the effect of a drone hit on terrorist attacks in ‘the
West’, there have been only eight such attacks over the research period, making this impossible.
The observation that the increase in terrorist attacks after a drone hit is concentrated in the rest
of the world rather than in Pakistan or Afghanistan is interesting in light of the other three families
of theoretical models. We might speculate that a new leader taking the place of a leader killed by
drone has greater trouble exerting control over far-away operatives than operatives close to home.
This contrasts with the backlash or signaling perspective. From either of those perspectives, we
might expect a stronger reaction in Pakistan, as most civilians killed are Pakistani, and because
operatives closer to the leader killed may have a greater incentive to signal strength.
21The coefficient on the leads of hit are jointly statistically significant in this specification, but a plot of the
coefficients reveals a downward trend in the number of terrorist attacks with a US victim prior to a drone hit
compared to a drone miss. Hence, there is no evidence that the probability of a drone hit is driven by an increasing
number of attacks on US citizens.
22In the models presented in columns (6) and (7), the leads of hit are jointly statistically significant. However,
they are only statistically significant at the 10% level and since this is two models among many, this may be due to
multiple testing.
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Table 8: Substitution of terrorist attack types
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES % success mean # vics. Military US vic. Pak. Afgh. ROW
t 0.0343 -0.238 0.230 0.0286 0.0405 0.0735 0.327***
(0.101) (2.194) (0.193) (0.0633) (0.110) (0.125) (0.127)
t+1 0.0434 0.314 0.331* -0.0559 -0.0409 -0.0539 0.175
(0.102) (2.193) (0.196) (0.0639) (0.110) (0.128) (0.128)
t+2 0.0577 1.293 0.589*** 0.0288 -0.117 0.01000 0.462***
(0.101) (2.188) (0.194) (0.0634) (0.110) (0.126) (0.127)
t+3 0.00324 -3.753* 0.545*** 0.0675 0.163 0.0699 0.331***
(0.101) (2.193) (0.193) (0.0634) (0.110) (0.126) (0.127)
t+4 -0.0284 0.165 0.0647 0.0762 -0.221** 0.0716 0.275**
(0.102) (2.189) (0.197) (0.0639) (0.110) (0.128) (0.129)
t+5 -0.178* -1.716 0.115 -0.0373 0.0189 0.0624 0.0544
(0.0999) (2.163) (0.192) (0.0627) (0.108) (0.125) (0.126)
t+6 0.0588 -3.004 0.532*** -0.0283 0.102 -0.0478 0.388***
(0.103) (2.237) (0.194) (0.0642) (0.111) (0.126) (0.127)
Observations 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,577
R-squared 0.676 0.186 0.741 0.355 0.818 0.893 0.797
Group FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Prob > F lags hit 0.5758 0.4155 0.0003 0.5433 0.0284 0.9266 0.0004
Prob > F leads hit 0.8584 0.3023 0.2727 0.0448 0.9328 0.0604 0.0889
Prob > F lags targeted 0.1070 0.1762 0.6854 0.5041 0.3375 0.2017 0.1575
Prob > F leads targeted 0.3795 0.9912 0.0390 0.0000 0.2110 0.1234 0.8604
Control mean 0.7582 3.9494 1.0786 0.0629 0.9475 0.2520 0.8349
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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7.3 Signaling
There is some evidence that a drone hit on a terrorist leader induces terrorist groups to signal their
strength and resolve by committing an increasing number of attacks (H3.1).
Attacks that send a strong signal may include attacks that quickly follow the drone strike, are
claimed, and hit high-profile targets. From the main results, the timing of the increase in terrorist
attacks is not obviously consistent with the signaling mechanism: statistically significant increases
in the number of terrorist attacks are only observed from two months after the drone hit onward
(Figure 1). Table 8 furthermore shows no increase in terrorist attacks on US citizens, which would
be a high-profile target.
Consistent with the signaling mechanism however, Column 6 of Table 6 does show a statistically
significant increase in the number of claimed terrorist attacks in month one and three after a drone
hit compared to after a drone miss. Coefficients are jointly statistically significant. Furthermore,
Table 8 column 3 also shows a significant increase in attacks on military targets, also high-profile,
after a drone hit.
Lastly, the incentive to signal strength may be greater after the death of more prominent leaders
(H3.2). The final columns of Table 7 explore this hypothesis. Results in these columns provide
some tentative support in favour of this hypothesis. Terrorist attacks are significantly higher in
the second month after a drone hit on a leader who is designated ‘first in command’ according to
the Stanford project (column 6), or for whom the US Department of Justice ever offered a reward
(column 5). However, lags on neither set of interaction terms are jointly statistically significant.
In sum, there is evidence in favour of some hypotheses following from the signaling mechanism.
Alternatively, we might think that patterns observed arise out of terrorist group’s desire for revenge.
However, not all hypotheses are supported with evidence and this mechanism cannot explain the
results on unclaimed attacks, group splintering or infighting.
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7.4 Backlash
There is no evidence that drones strikes killing civilians are associated with an increase in terrorist
attacks, as backlash would suggest (H4.1).
Even if drone strikes cause backlash, this effect does not necessarily coincide with the effect
of targeted leader killing. Backlash would affect the analysis only if drone hits on a leader killed
more civilians than drone misses, and Table 2 does not provide any evidence for this. There is
also no evidence that terrorist organizations specifically use drone strikes on terrorist leaders in
their recruitment propaganda: propaganda refers to drone strikes as a ‘failing’ policy and does not
emphasize hits on terrorist leaders (Ludvigsen, 2018).
Nevertheless, I test whether drone strikes killing civilians are associated with an increase in
terrorist attacks. To do so, I estimate two variations on equation 1. The first variation replaces
hitit with the number of civilian casualties from drone strikes targeting group i in month t and
targetedit with the total number of casualties from drone strikes in month t on group i. The second
variation replaces hitit with an indicator that equals one if some drone strike in month t targeting
terrorist group i instead killed only civilians23, and targetedit with an indicator for any drone strike
in month t on group i. These specifications do not control for the total number of drone strikes
to avoid multicolinearity. BIJ provides maximum and minimum casualty estimates. Table 9 shows
results from maximum casualty estimates, but similar results are obtained when using minimum
casualty estimates (not shown).
Table 9 provides no evidence that drone strikes hitting only civilians, or done strikes hitting
many civilians, are associated with an increase in terrorist attacks, compared to other drone strikes
(H4.1). If anything, it shows a decrease in the number of terrorist attacks, by the terrorist group
itself and by an aggregation of all terrorist groups in the study24. The sign on virtually all coefficients
is negative, although coefficients on the lags of the dependent variable of interest are not jointly
statistically significant in each instance.
23If the maximum number of civilian casualties is larger than or equal to the minimum total number of casualties
from a drone strike (for maximum civilian casualty estimates), or if the maximum number of civilian casualties is
equal to the maximum total number of casualties (for minimum civilian casualty estimates).




k=−6 δt−ktargetedt−k + λt + εt, where λ captures a linear
time trend
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Table 9: Drone strikes with civilian casualties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Terr. att. Terr. att. Terr. att. Terr. att.
t -0.0140*** -0.0381 -0.0147* 0.667***
(0.00435) (0.0760) (0.00844) (0.248)
t+1 -0.0160*** -0.149* -0.00875 -0.0192
(0.00436) (0.0762) (0.00864) (0.315)
t+2 -0.0166*** -0.0828 -0.0136** -0.749**
(0.00435) (0.0780) (0.00682) (0.334)
t+3 -0.0127*** -0.0617 0.00120 0.322
(0.00434) (0.0770) (0.00490) (0.243)
t+4 -0.0102** -0.00751 -0.00694 -0.278
(0.00446) (0.0760) (0.00905) (0.270)
t+5 -0.00602 -0.101 -0.00550 -0.382
(0.00450) (0.0767) (0.0116) (0.256)
t+6 -0.00353 -0.0583 0.00458 -0.435
(0.00440) (0.0809) (0.00747) (0.301)
Observations 1,577 1,577 132 132
R-squared 0.858 0.848
Indep. var. # civ only civ # civ only civ
Control # cas strike # cas strike
Model Gr-mnth Gr-mnth Month Month
Group FE YES YES NO NO
Period FE YES YES NO NO
Time trend NO NO YES YES
Affiliate FE NO NO NO NO
Prob > F lags 0.0026 0.4792 0.1866 0.0007
Prob > F leads 0.0000 0.0001 0.1546 0.7323
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
This study by no means convincingly shows that drone strikes causing civilian casualties decrease
terrorist violence. In two of the specifications shown, the leads of the dependent variable are jointly
statistically significant. As this provides evidence that the parallel trends assumption is violated,
these results should be interpreted with due caution. The sole purpose of this exercise is to show
the lack of evidence in favour backlash.
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8 Conclusion
Exploiting a natural experiment provided by drone strikes hitting and missing terrorist leaders
in FATA, Pakistan, this paper investigates how drone strikes killing terrorist leaders – and un-
dermining control within terrorist organizations – affect terrorist attacks. It suggests that such
counterterrorism policies can backfire, and that terrorist groups whose leader is killed increase the
number of attacks they commit in three out of six months after the drone hit by between 47.7%
and 70.3%.
This paper suggests that the most likely explanation for this result is that the new leader is less
able or willing to exert control over the group’s operatives, following theoretical models by Shapiro
(2013) and Abrahms and Potter (2015). Although unable to measure control within terrorist
organizations directly, this paper provides evidence in favour of six hypotheses indirectly testing
whether drone strikes undermine control. We have theoretical reasons and empirical reasons to
expect that leaders exert control to limit indiscriminate violence against civilians, and that leaders
strategically leave attacks they did not sanction unclaimed. This paper provides evidence that drone
strikes killing terrorist leaders lead to more terrorist attacks targeting civilians (echoing results
obtained by Abrahms and Mierau (2017)) and more unclaimed terrorist attacks. Less control of
terrorist leaders over operatives might also translate into changes in the organizational structure
of terrorist groups. This paper finds drone hits to be related to terrorist group splintering and
infighting. Finally, the effect of a decrease in control is predicted to be larger for those groups and
leaders that relied more strongly on central control to begin with.
Some evidence is also found in favour of signaling (or revenge) as a theoretical explanation. In
some of the six months after a drone hit on a terrorist leader, the number of terrorist attacks on
military targets, and claimed terrorist attacks increases.
Two caveats to these results are in order. First, this paper is only able to capture the medium-
term effect (six to fifteen months) of targeted leader killing. It has been suggested that terrorist
organizations, specifically Al-Qaida, are in the process of disintegration partially because their lead-
ers have been consistently killed or captured, and that increased violence may be the organization’s
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“death throws” (Cronin 2006). Although I cannot exclude the possibility that this may happen
in the future, the number of attacks by the terrorist organizations studied in this paper currently
shows no sign of decreasing. In fact, the number of attacks has increased over eight-fold between
2004 and 2015. Secondly, this paper investigates the effect of drone hits relative to drone misses.
It cannot comment on the effect of the threat of drone strikes, i.e. the number of terrorist attacks
in the current state of the world, relative to a counterfactual world in which terrorist leaders were
never targeted by drone. Similarly, it cannot comment on individuals’ willingness to join terrorist
groups in a world with and without drone strikes risking civilian casualties. Hence results do not
directly translate into an assessment of the overall impact of the use of drone technology.
The conclusion that drone strikes may undermine control within terrorist groups has important
policy implications beyond counterterrorism, in the arenas of law and diplomacy. Legal scholars
suggest that the lawfulness of drone strikes under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) depends
on an armed group’s level of internal organization (Heyns et al., 2016). For IHL to apply to drone
strikes, they must take place in the context of a Non-International Armed Conflict. The level of
organization of parties to the conflict, including the existence of a command structure, is one of two
criteria used to determine whether a situation is thus classified (Heyns et al., 2016). The results
presented in this paper suggest that drone strikes, by virtue of their own ‘success’ in killing leaders
and undermining terrorist command structure, may contribute to making themselves unlawful.
Undermining leaders’ control over a terrorist organization may furthermore undermine the
prospect of peace talks. Peace agreements between the Pakistani government and terrorist groups
are common: Staniland et al. (2018) document 24 individual peace deals. However, anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that leader killing by drone may impede such agreements. For example, TTP leader
Hakimullah Mehsud was reportedly ready to participate in peace talks, but following his death
by drone, TTP splintered over the question of whether to engage in such talks and TTP attacks
spiked (Crenshaw (2012)). Future research may investigate the impact of drone strikes, or other
counterterrorism policies, on terrorist group splintering and peace agreements in greater detail.
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A.1 Terrorist groups included in dataset (as classified by BIJ)
Table A.1
Group Subgroups25 Start month26
Al-Qaida AQ in Iraq
AQ in the Arab Peninsula
AQ Indian Subcontinent
Abu Kasha’s group
Islamic Army of Great Britain
Lashkar al Zil
Al-Badr
East Turkestan Islamic Movement
Haqqani Network Maulvi Ihsanullah’s faction
Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Islamic Jihad Union







Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistani (TTP) Khan Said’s faction December 2007
Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s faction
Jamaat e Islami Azad Kashmir
Sajna faction
25This table does not give a comprehensive overview of subgroups of these terrorist groups, merely of those
subgroups that are named in the BIJ data.








3=both a vehicle and a building 
9=unknown/other 
 
Record the physical object hit by the strike, 







Code 1 if AT LEAST ONE of the following is 
satisfied:  
1. Report includes a NAMED individual 
classified by BIJ as “leader”, “commander”, 
“senior figure” or similar of a militant 
group, who, or a location associated with 
whom, is named by BIJ as “target” of a 
drone strike, potential or otherwise, or is 
mentioned as (falsely) claimed to have died 
in or as a result of the strike by any source. 
2. BIJ identifies as a target of the strike, 
potential or otherwise, OR as having died in 
or as a result of the strike  
a. Individuals (allegedly) associated 
with a NAMED militant group, OR 
b. (alleged) militants (allegedly) 
associated with a NAMED 
individual, identified implicitly or 
explicitly as leader or similar of a 
militant group, OR 
c.  a location associated with a 
NAMED militant group. 
Code 0 otherwise. 
 
IF 0: leave all remaining fields blank 
IF 1: for EACH UNIQUE NAMED militant group 
under (2.) or associated with individual(s) under (1.) 
AND EACH UNIQUE NAMED individual NOT 
associated with a named militant group under (1.) or 
(2.) fill in the remaining fields. 
 








FOR EACH UNIQUE named militant group or 
named individual not associated with a militant 
group 
Code 1 if ALL of the following are satisfied 
1. A named individual OR a gathering of more 
than two unnamed individuals, 
2. Classified by BIJ as “leader(s)”, 
“commander(s)”, “senior figure(s) or similar 
of a militant group 
3. Was either 
a. Named by BIJ as “target” of the 
drone strike, potential or otherwise 
b. Mentioned as (falsely) claimed to 
have died in or as a result of the 
strike by any source. 








Blank if group?HVTtarget=0 
 
FOR EACH UNIQUE named militant group or 
named individual not associated with a militant 
group 
 
Code 1 if ANY of the individuals recorded under 
group?HVTname have died in, or as a result of 
injuries incurred during, the drone strike.  
Code 9 if BIJ mentions the death of ALL 
individuals recorded under group?HVTname is 
uncertain and/or if the BIJ cites conflicting reports 
on the death of ALL individuals recorded under 
group?HVTname.  




Text field (codes available) 
 
Blank if group?HVTtarget=0 AND group?militant 
is EITHER 2, 3, OR 4 not involving a location 
associated with a named leader.  
 
FOR EACH UNIQUE militant group or named 
individual not associated with a militant group 
 
Record name(s) of HVT(s) under group?HVTtarget 
and group?militant IF group?militant=1 OR 
group?militant=4 and it involves a location 
associated with a named leader, separated by ; and 
including any aliases in brackets ( ). 
 
A.2 Codebook targeted leader killing
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Record ‘gathering’ if group?HVTtarget=1 because 





1=Militants associated with HVT 
2=Named militants 
3=Unnamed militants 
4=Location associated with militants 
 
Blank if group?HVTtarget=1 
 
FOR EACH UNIQUE named militant group or 
named individual not associated with a militant 
group  
record the LOWEST code applicable. Code: 
1. If BIJ identifies as a target of the strike, 
potential or otherwise, OR as having died in 
or as a result of the strike, one or more 
individuals identified as (alleged) militant(s) 
AND associated with, or alleged to be 
associated with, a NAMED individual (or 
“Named individual’s group”) identified 
implicitly or explicitly as leader or similar of 
a militant group.  
2. If BIJ identifies as a target of the strike, 
potential or otherwise, OR as having died in 
or as a result of the strike, one or more 
individual(s) BY NAME AND as militant(s) 
or alleged militant(s) associated with the 
named group. 
3. If BIJ identifies as a target of the strike, 
potential or otherwise, OR as having died in 
or as a result of the strike, one or more 
UNNAMED individual(s) as (alleged) 
militant(s) associated with the named group. 
4. If BIJ records that the location that was 
struck is (allegedly) associated with the 
named militant group or a named individual 
classified as “leader”, “commander” “senior 





Text field, see spelling below 
 
FOR EACH UNIQUE militant group, record name 
of: 
1. the militant group the HVT is associated 
with if group?HVTtarget=1, OR 
group?militant=1 OR group?militant=4 and 
this involves a location associated with an 
HVT. 
2. the militant group militants are associated 
with if group?militant=2 OR 
group?militant=3 
3. the militant group the location struck is 
associated with if group?militant=4 AND 
this does NOT involve a location associated 
with a an HVT. 
 
Record ‘unknown’ if group?HVTtarget=1 OR 
group?militant=1 AND the HVT is NOT 
associated with a militant group. 
 
AQ: Al Qaeda 
Haqqani: Haqqani network 
LeI: Lashkar-e-Islam 
IMU: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
Afghan Taliban: Afghan Taliban 
TTP: Pakistani Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistani, 
Local Taliban 
Taliban: Taliban, unspecified 
 
Foreigner: including “Arab”, “non-local” or 
individuals of a specific nationality not Pakistani, 
Afghani, Uzbek or Punjabi.  
NOT TO BE CODED SIMULTANESOULY 
WITH AQ 
Punjabi: Punjabi militants 
Uzbeks: Uzbeks, Uzbek militants.  




A.3 Terrorist leaders included in dataset
Table A.2
Leader name Group Subgroup # times targeted hit
Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi Al-Qaida AQI 0 0
Abu Yahya al-Libi Al-Qaida 2 1
Ahmad Farouq Al-Qaida AQIS 3 1
Amran Ali Siddiqi Al-Qaida AQIS 1 1
Atiyah adb al-Rahman Al-Qaida 3 1
Ayman al-Zawahiri Al-Qaida 2 0
Badruddin Haqqani Haqqani network 2 1
Baitullah Mehsud TTP 3 1
Hafiz Gul Bahadur TTP 2 0
Hakimullah Mehsud TTP 5 1
Jalaluddin Haqqani Haqqani network 0 0
Maulana Faqir Muhammed TTP 1 0
Maulvi Ahmad Jan Haqqani network 1 1
Maulvi Nazir27 Taliban Maulvi Nazir group 2 1
Muhammad Ilywas Kashmiri Harkat-ul-Jihad 5 1
Mustafa Abu al-Yazid AQ 1 1
Nasser al-Wuhayshi AQ AQAP 1 0
Qari Hussain TTP 6 1
Qarri Imran AQ AQIS 1 1
Sangeen Sadran Haqqani network 3 1
Sirajuddin Haqqani Haqqani network 1 0
Wali ur Rehman Mehsud TTP 1 1
TOTAL 4628 15
27Note that major attacks by the Maulvi Nazir faction as identified by the Stanford project are all coded as having
been perpetrated by the ‘Taliban’ by the GTD. Hence, this faction is classified as Taliban, even though it was briefly
merged with the TTP (Crenshaw, 2012)
28Note that the unit of analysis for this Table is the leader, whereas the unit of analysis in Table 2 of the main
text is the group. As one drone strike targeted (and missed) two leaders from the same group simultaneously, the
number of individual leaders targeted equals 46, but the number of times a drone strike targeted a group’s leader
equals 45.
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B Further results and robustness checks
B.1 Graphs of terrorist attacks and drone hits and misses
Graphs B.1-B.5 depict raw data on (unlogged) terrorist attacks, and drone hits and misses on
terrorist leaders, for those terrorist groups that experienced at least one hit and one miss. The
number of terrorist attacks by group fluctuates strongly over time, in periods after drone hits or
misses and in periods without drone attempts on a group’s leader. From these graphs alone, it is
difficult to discern any definitive pattern in the number of terrorist attacks after a drone hit, versus
after a drone miss.
B.2 Bias due to misreporting and measurement error
Two kinds of biases could affect the main results. First, media may be more likely to report on
terrorist attacks by a group in the six months after its leader was hit by a drone, compared to when
he was missed. Second, there may a time trend in the likelihood that GTD attributes a terrorist
attack to a particular group, which could correlate with the group-specific probability that a drone
strike targeting its leader succeeds in killing him. Simulations show that either type of reporting
bias would have to be substantial in size for it to fully account for the main results.
B.2.1 Differential probability of media reporting of terrorist attacks after a drone hit
or miss
Media may be more likely to report terrorist attacks by a terrorist group after a drone strike hit
its leader, compared to after a drone miss. This could arise if a drone hit on a group’s leader puts
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Al-Qaida
a group at the center of the news cycle, whereas a drone miss does so to a lesser degree. This
may be somewhat plausible, although a news item along the lines of “leader runs free and orders
attacks” might be equally news-worthy as “group takes revenge after drone strike kills its leader”.
In addition, recall that the main analysis finds the strongest effect on terrorist attacks only in two
to six months after a drone hit. This time-frame is much longer than we can expect any news cycle
to be.
A look at news sources cited by GTD29 further undermines the idea that reporting of terrorist
attacks is strongly influenced by the success or failure of US drone strikes. Out of the top 20 media
sources cited, over half are non-Western media, mainly from Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also
from China and the Philippines. Reporting on terrorist attacks by these sources is plausibly driven
29Analysis of the number of times a particular media source is cited is somewhat hampered because GTD naming
of these sources is not always consistent across events
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by national dynamics rather than US counterterrorism.
Nevertheless, I formally investigate the degree of reporting bias necessary to produce the main
results. To do so, I start from the assumption that the number of terrorist attacks is completely
unaffected by drone strikes: that the actual probability of a terrorist attack by some group is the
same for the six months after a drone hit, the six months after a drone miss and in absence of
prior drone strikes targeting its leader. However, the probability that the media will report the
terrorist attack may differ across these periods. Specifically, I benchmark the likelihood of the
media reporting a terrorist attack by a group in the six months after a drone hit on its leader at
1: P (report|hit = 1). The probability of media reporting a terrorist attack by a group in the six
months after a miss on its leader is P (report|miss) < 1, and the probability of the media reporting
a terrorist attack by a group at any other time (including in periods after a drone strike not aimed
at the group’s leader) is P (report|none) < 1. I assume P (report|miss) > P (report|none): a group
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is more newsworthy after a drone miss on its leader than after no drone strike targeting its leader
at all.
To reflect this situation, I create 100 simulated datasets of terrorist attacks, in which the number
of terrorist attacks by a group in a particular month is drawn randomly from a negative binomial
distribution. The negative binomial distribution is chosen because it outperforms the Poisson
distribution in a likelihood-ratio test for ten of the thirteen groups, and because there is no evidence
that a zero-inflated negative binomial distribution outperforms the negative binomial distribution
for any of the groups. For groups with at least one drone hit, parameters of the negative binomial
distribution are estimated from the number of terrorist attacks reported in GTD for the six months
after a drone hit on its leader. For groups with no drone hits, these parameters are estimated from
all terrorist attacks by the group reported in GTD. Note that because parameters are estimated
for each group individually, no group and period fixed effects are included, and negative binomial
regression can be consistently estimated. As expected, the simulated datasets contain substantially
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more terrorist attacks than GTD.
Assume that media only report terrorist attacks with some probability. For each of the 100
simulated datasets of terrorist attacks, I simulate the number of reported terrorist attacks for each
group in each month. The number of reported terrorist attacks is randomly drawn from a binomial
distribution, where n equals the simulated number of terrorist attacks and p equals 1 for the six
months after a drone hit, P (report|miss) = [0.05, 0.1, 0.15...0.95, 1] for the six months after a miss,
and P (report|none) = [0.1, 0.2...0.9, 1] for all other group-months. For each of the 84 combinations
of probabilities allowed by the assumption P (report|miss) > P (report|none), I simulate the number
of reported terrorist attacks 10 times, resulting in a total of 84.000 iterations.
I run specification 1 in the main text for each iteration. The test statistic is the share of
regressions that give a statistically significant coefficient estimate on at least one lag of hit. Recall
that the analysis in the main paper gives three such significant coefficients.
Table B.1 reports the results from the simulation. It displays all combinations of P (report|miss)
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and P (report|none) for which P (report|miss) > P (report|none), and the corresponding share of
simulated regressions that result in a statistically significant coefficients on at least one of the six lags
of hit. To obtain a single statistically significant coefficient with 95% certainty, media would have
to report all terrorist attacks by a group after a drone strike hit its leader and only approximately
65% of terrorist attacks by the group after a drone strike missed its leader. The share of terrorist
attacks reported by the media reported in the period not following either a hit or a miss does not
strongly affect this conclusion. This seems a high level of reporting bias, especially over a six-month
time frame and considering that the analysis in the main paper obtains three statistically significant
coefficients.
B.2.2 Terrorist attacks with an unknown perpetrator
A second type of bias might arise because GTD records the perpetrator of a terrorist attack with
error, and often cannot attribute terrorist attacks to a particular terrorist group. If there is a
57
Table B.1: Simulation of reporting bias
P(report — none) 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
P(report — miss)
0.95 .49 .496 .5 .489 .486 .471 .427 .386 .304
0.90 .58 .588 .585 .568 .554 .535 .503 .452 .374
0.85 .683 .682 .677 .658 .637 .59 .527 .439
0.80 .774 .78 .771 .77 .726 .703 .633 .545
0.75 .863 .863 .859 .851 .823 .765 .646
0.70 .91 .918 .905 .913 .888 .864 .782
0.65 .956 .954 .951 .944 .93 .888
0.60 .985 .989 .986 .963 .943
0.55 .999 .999 .998 .994 .975
0.50 1 1 1 .996
0.45 1 1 1 1
0.40 1 1 1





This table displays the share of simulated regressions with at least one coefficient statistically significant at the 5%
level at the given probability that media report an attack by a terrorist group in the six months after a drone miss
on its leader, and given no drone attempt on its leader respectively. Probability of media reporting an attack by a
terrorist group in the six months after a drone hit on its leader is set to 1.
group-specific time trend in whether the media, and thus GTD, attribute terrorist attacks to a
terrorist group, this could bias the analysis. For it to do so, this trend would have to be correlated
with the probability that a drone strike targeting the group’s leader succeeds in killing him.
Figure B.6 shows the number of terrorist attacks in GTD over time that are and are not at-
tributed to a known perpetrator. The numbers of attributed and unattributed attacks track each
other fairly closely for the nine years of the research period. However, they diverge for the last
three years, after 2013, which could introduce bias if trends in the probability that GTD attributes
a terrorist attack to a group in the main dataset correlate to trends in the probability that a drone
attempt on those groups’ leaders’ lives succeeds.
Figure B.7 investigates whether drone hits on the leaders of the thirteen terrorist groups in
the main dataset correlate to the number of unattributed terrorist attacks worldwide. For this
purpose, I aggregate the main dataset to the month level, for each month taking the maximum of
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the indicators hit and targeted and sum of the number of all drone strikes, regardless of whether
they target a leader, which functions as a control variable. The dependent variable is the logged
number of terrorist attacks with an unknown perpetrator in GTD. As is evident from Figure B.7,
the number of unattributed terrorist attacks is unrelated to drone hits. Coefficients on all leads
and lags of hit are individually and jointly insignificant.
I use a simulation to further investigate the sensitivity of the main results to bias resulting from
unattributed terrorist attacks. For this simulation, I attribute a share of terrorist attacks GTD
classifies as committed by an “unknown” perpetrator to each of the thirteen groups in the main
dataset. This is done using random draws from a binomial distribution, where n equals the total
number of unattributed terrorist attacks worldwide and p equals the three-month rolling average
of the share of worldwide terrorist attacks with a known perpetrator that GTD attributes to each
group. This introduces a flexible, group-specific time trend in the probability that an unattributed
terrorist attack should in reality have been attributed to one of the thirteen terrorist groups. Draws
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Unattributed terrorist attacks
are repeated 1000 times. The number of attacks newly attributed to the terrorist group is added
to the number of terrorist attacks by the group in GTD and this sum is logged. Specification 1 in
the main text is run on each simulated dataset.
Table B.2 contains the results of this simulation. It displays the 2nd and 98th percentile of
the distribution of coefficients for each of the six lags of hit, which constitutes the upper and lower
bound of a simulated 96% confidence interval. Implied confidence intervals for 5 out of 6 coefficients
are positive and exclude zero. In 88% of simulated regressions, the coefficient on at least one of the
lags of hit is statistically significant.
This simulation constitutes a fairly strict test of the impact of reporting bias resulting from
unattributed terrorist attacks. Several of the thirteen terrorist groups in the main dataset are
high-profile organizations, and we might expect that the share of terrorist attacks with a known
perpetrator attributed to them by GTD exceeds the share of terrorist attacks with an unknown
perpetrator mistakenly not attributed to them. Given simulated confidence intervals and statistical
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Table B.2: Simulation of bias in allocating attacks by unknown perpetrator







This table displays 2th and 98th percentile of simulated coefficients obtained when allocating terrorist attacks with
an unknown perpetrator to terrorist groups included in this study based on the 3-month rolling share of worldwide
terrorist attacks with a known perpetrator that these groups committed
significance of simulated individual coefficients, we can conclude that results obtained in the main
paper largely hold in this strict test.
B.3 Simulations of expanded sample size
By expanding the sample using simulated data, this section explores whether the lack of statistical
significance of the coefficients on individual lags (or leads) of hit is due to a small sample size. The
main results, in which three lags and none of the leads carry statistically significant coefficients, are
based on 12 years of data, and 45 hits and misses on terrorist leaders.
To expand the dataset, I add additional years to the end of the dataset, in five-year increments.
Data on terrorist attacks, drone hits and misses on terrorist leaders, and number of drone strikes
for all additional periods is drawn randomly based on the actual group-specific distribution of these
variables. Data on terrorist attacks (drone strikes) is drawn from a negative binomial distribu-
tion, where parameters r and p differ by terrorist group and are estimated using the actual data.
The negative binomial distribution is chosen because it outperforms the Poisson distribution in a
likelihood-ratio test for ten (five in the case of drone strikes) of the thirteen groups, and because
there is no evidence that a zero-inflated negative binomial distribution outperforms the negative
binomial distribution for any of the groups. Note that because parameters are estimated for each
group individually, no group and period fixed effects are included, and negative binomial regression
can be consistently estimated. Data on drone hits and misses is drawn from a binomial distribution,
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where n equals one and p equals the actual group-specific probability of a drone hit or miss on a
terrorist leader respectively.
Draws are repeated one thousand times for each sample size, and specification 1 in the main text
is run on each simulated dataset. The 5th and 95th percentile of the resulting thousand coefficients
demarcate the simulated 90% confidence interval for a given sample size. Figure 8 displays these
90% confidence intervals, together with the main results, the actual coefficient estimates obtained
when running specification 1 in the main text on the original sample.
Simulations suggest that the sample size would have to be radically expanded to make a mean-
ingful difference to the statistical significance of individual coefficients. Only after expanding the
sample with fifty additional simulated years, more than quintupling the original dataset in size, do
more coefficients on lags of hit gain statistical significance at the 10% level. This suggests that the
first, fourth and fifth lag of hit are null. A similar observation holds for the leads of hit, although a
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single lead gains statistical significance after adding ten additional simulated years to the dataset,
and one gains statistical significance after adding 25 additional years of data. Even when radically
expanding the dataset, simulations never indicate an immediate (i.e. in the same month, or the
month immediately following) effect of a drone hit on a terrorist leader compared to a drone miss.
Nor do results of any of the simulations indicate a divergence in trends between a hit and a miss in
the two months immediately preceding the drone strike.
B.4 Choice of econometric specifications
The preferred specification in the main paper is OLS, using a logged count of terrorist attacks as
a dependent variable. For the particular specification presented in the main paper, using OLS has
several advantages over using negative binomial regression, a commonly used alternative.
To estimate p-values for the statistical significance of individual coefficients, OLS relies on the
assumption that residuals are normally distributed. Figure B.9 suggests that residuals of an OLS
regression on a logged count of terrorist affects are indeed approximately normally distributed
(bottom panel). This assuages concerns that standard errors from the OLS regressions in the main
paper are biased downward due to non-normal distribution of residuals. The same cannot be said
for the distribution of residuals from an OLS regression using the raw count of terrorist attacks
as a dependent variable, which in places deviates from the normal distribution (top panel). This
provides a clear argument for taking the log of terrorist attacks (ln(attacks + 1)) as a dependent
variable.
The main argument against using negative binomial regression to analyze the raw count of
terrorist attacks, is that unconditional fixed effects negative binomial regression has been shown
to give inconsistent and biased results in the presence of many fixed effects (Hilbe, 2011; Allison,
2012). Specification 1 in the main text contains 145 fixed effects, well above the threshold of 20 that
Hilbe (2011) gives as a rule of thumb for what constitutes ‘many’. Simulations show that potential
bias is small in size in particular cases (e.g. Allison and Waterman (2002)). However, these simu-
lations investigate a case markedly different from the one presented in the main paper: simulations
investigate cases with many cross-sectional and no time-fixed effects, whereas specification 1 in the
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main text has few cross-sectional and many time-fixed effects. As such, the extent of bias that us-
ing unconditional fixed effects negative binomial regression would introduce to the present analysis
is not known. Alternatively, one might use conditional fixed effects negative binomial regression.
Although this does give consistent results this has long been shown to not be a true fixed effects
estimator and it has fallen into disuse (Allison and Waterman, 2002). Hence, although results from
both specifications are presented in section B.5, these should be treated with caution.
Other count models, notably Poisson regression, can be consistently estimated in the presence of
fixed effects. However, Poisson regression and zero-inflated Poisson regression suffer from overdis-
persion. A likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis that the overdispersion parameter is zero
(p < 0.0000), implying that Poisson-estimated standard errors are biased downward. Zero-inflated
negative binomial regression is subject to the same problems as negative binomial regression.
Using OLS as the main specification is also advantageous because it allows the use of Newey-
West standard errors robust to autocorrelation. As the present analysis involves a long time series,
autocorrelation is a serious concern. Newey-West standard errors cannot be readily estimated for
count models.
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B.5 Alternative econometric specifications
Table B.3 investigates the robustness of the main results (reproduced in column 1) to the use of
alternative econometric specifications.
To investigate whether the joint statistical significance of the coefficients on the lags hit is an
artefact of the inclusion of the leads of hit, column 2 presents the main results excluding all lead
variables. Main results are unaffected. Similarly, the lack of joint statistical significance of the
coefficients on the leads of hit does not depend on the inclusion of the lags of hit (column 3).
Column 4 restricts the analysis to periods within 6 months of a drone strike targeting a leader
of some terrorist group. Again, results are unaffected. The model in column 5 includes linear
group-time trends instead of period-fixed effects, giving results very similar to the main results.
As column 6 shows, results are somewhat sensitive to using HAC instead of Newey-West standard
errors: although the third lag of hit is still statistically significant at the 5% level, the coefficients on
lags are no longer jointly statistically significant at conventional levels (p = 0.1150). Main results
are robust to using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (column 7).
Columns 8 and 9 estimate specification 1 in the main text using negative binomial regression
instead of OLS, taking the raw count of terrorist attacks as a dependent variable. As highlighted in
section B.4, these results should be taken with caution: unconditional negative binomial regression
has been shown to give inconsistent results in the presence of many fixed effects, and conditional
negative binomial regression is not a true fixed effects estimator. Keeping these caveats in mind,
results are weakened when using either estimator. None of the resulting individual coefficients on
lags of hit are statistically significant in column 8, and only one coefficient is statistically significant
at the 10% level in column 9. However, in both regressions, coefficients on hit are jointly statistically
significant at the 5% level. For both regressions, the p-value for joint significance is obtained using
a likelihood ratio test, not an Wald test as is the case for linear models.
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Table B.3: Alternative econometric specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
<7 mnths Uncond. Cond.
Baseline Only lags Only leads from targeted Baseline Baseline Baseline Neg. bin. Neg. bin.
VARIABLES Terr.att. Terr.att. Terr.att. Terr.att. Terr.att. Terr.att. Terr.att. Terr.att. Terr.att.
t 0.298 0.233 0.289 0.147 0.298 0.298 0.0127 -0.0991
(0.191) (0.186) (0.185) (0.152) (0.227) (0.256) (0.222) (0.255)
t+1 0.209 0.120 0.187 -0.00636 0.209 0.209 0.0368 0.0671
(0.193) (0.192) (0.187) (0.152) (0.230) (0.198) (0.347) (0.263)
t+2 0.390** 0.374* 0.363* 0.195 0.390 0.390 0.0853 0.0994
(0.191) (0.194) (0.185) (0.152) (0.266) (0.255) (0.225) (0.248)
t+3 0.533*** 0.537*** 0.517*** 0.291* 0.533*** 0.533*** 0.534 0.453*
(0.191) (0.190) (0.185) (0.151) (0.198) (0.185) (0.478) (0.257)
t+4 0.119 0.130 0.104 -0.0455 0.119 0.119 -0.126 -0.238
(0.194) (0.194) (0.188) (0.152) (0.260) (0.269) (0.111) (0.262)
t+5 0.0951 0.0363 0.0785 -0.0517 0.0951 0.0951 -0.170 -0.105
(0.189) (0.191) (0.183) (0.149) (0.191) (0.142) (0.171) (0.271)
t+6 0.422** 0.300 0.394** 0.198 0.422 0.422** 0.400 0.364
(0.192) (0.184) (0.186) (0.152) (0.275) (0.210) (0.341) (0.269)
Constant 1.136 -0.0531
(1.039) (0.605)
Observations 1,577 1,655 1,655 1,368 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,577
R-squared 0.850 0.847 0.836 0.869 0.891 0.850 0.850
Includes 6 leads YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Group FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Month FE YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES
Group-Month trend NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
Standard errors N. West N. West N. West N. West N. West HAC Drisc.-Kr. Clustered IOM
p-val lags hit 0.0236 0.0292 0.0273 0.1760 0.1150 0.0228 0.0431 0.0179
p-val leads hit 0.6137 0.3193 0.6125 0.7345 0.9258 0.9609 0.3023 0.1920
p-val lags targeted 0.8760 0.7974 0.8983 0.6576 0.9707 0.9493 0.1194 0.1140
p-val leads targeted 0.2688 0.4640 0.2853 0.0937 0.6053 0.0489 0.2745 0.0622
Control mean 1.9450 1.9450 1.9450 1.9450 1.9450 1.9450 1.9450 11.0792 11.0792
Number of groupid 13
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Table B.4: Alternative counterfactuals and further robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Cntrfac: Cntrfac: Only < Drop 2 Region- Region- Region- Exp.
Baseline drone strike leader named Sept. 2015 small gr. Gr.-mnth Gr.-mnth Gr.-mnth sample
VARIABLES Terr.att. Terr.att. Terr.att. Terr.att. Terr.att. Terr.att. Terr.att. Terr.att. Terr.att.
t 0.298 0.209 0.385** 0.298 0.459* 0.124 0.124*** 0.124 0.396*
(0.191) (0.141) (0.156) (0.191) (0.235) (0.101) (0.0469) (0.103) (0.222)
t+1 0.209 0.120 0.204 0.209 0.381 0.0308 0.0308 0.0308 0.255
(0.193) (0.143) (0.158) (0.193) (0.239) (0.102) (0.0471) (0.104) (0.219)
t+2 0.390** 0.299** 0.448*** 0.390** 0.760*** 0.109 0.109** 0.109 0.472*
(0.191) (0.142) (0.158) (0.191) (0.236) (0.0980) (0.0463) (0.100) (0.280)
t+3 0.533*** 0.480*** 0.530*** 0.533*** 0.778*** 0.135 0.135*** 0.135 0.585***
(0.191) (0.142) (0.158) (0.191) (0.237) (0.100) (0.0472) (0.103) (0.185)
t+4 0.119 0.214 0.174 0.119 0.433* 0.0688 0.0688 0.0688 0.233
(0.194) (0.144) (0.159) (0.194) (0.242) (0.107) (0.0486) (0.110) (0.276)
t+5 0.0951 0.130 0.0885 0.0951 0.297 0.0162 0.0162 0.0162 0.202
(0.189) (0.146) (0.161) (0.189) (0.230) (0.106) (0.0481) (0.109) (0.172)
t+6 0.422** 0.512*** 0.456*** 0.422** 0.980*** 0.0871 0.0871* 0.0871 0.454*
(0.192) (0.147) (0.162) (0.192) (0.229) (0.111) (0.0525) (0.113) (0.264)
Observations 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,313 6,308 6,308 6,308 10,421
R-squared 0.850 0.849 0.852 0.850 0.869 0.276 0.842 0.290 0.753
Group FE YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES
Region FE NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Region-group FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Region-period FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Prob > F lags hit 0.0236 0.0009 0.0020 0.0236 0.0000 0.438 0.0294 0.460 0.0365
Prob > F leads hit 0.6137 0.1203 0.0571 0.614 0.0701 0.523 0.0201 0.544 0.8714
Prob > F lags targeted 0.8760 0.876 0.7061 0.953 0.823 0.956 0.9542
Prob > F leads targeted 0.2688 0.269 0.8737 0.704 0.335 0.717 0.5762
Control mean 1.9450 1.9450 1.9450 1.945 1.9450 0.574 0.574 0.574 1.9450
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses, column (9) displays HAC standard errors
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Table B.4 presents a final set of robustness checks. Drone misses are measured with error:
a leader may have been targeted by a particular drone strike, but this may be unobserved by
the media or the BIJ. Hence one may be concerned that the main results are an artefact of this
measurement error. Therefore, columns 2 and 3 investigate alternative counterfactuals for a drone
hit that may be more easily observed. In column 2 any drone strike not killing a terrorist leader
is taken as a counterfactual. In column 3, any drone strike in which a leader is named, but not
necessarily targeted is considered a counterfactual. These include drone strikes targeting militants
closely associated with the leader, locations associated with the terrorist leader – commonly a
known residence – or family members of the terrorist leader. Coefficient estimates on hit are
similar to those obtained in the baseline model (column 1), and they are strongly jointly statistically
significant (1% level). These are not the preferred specifications however, as it becomes more difficult
to substantiate the parallel trends assumption. In column 3 leads of hit are jointly statistically
significant, albeit only at the 10% level. Perhaps unsurprisingly, groups that have their militants
but not their leaders (or individuals or locations associated with their leaders rather than their
leaders themselves) targeted may already commit an increasing number of terrorist attacks prior
to a drone strike.
Results are unaffected when excluding periods after September 2015, the month in which the
Pakistani military acquired its own weaponized drones (Column 4).
Some may be concerned that the probability of a hit on a terrorist leader conditional on a leader
being targeted is different for the leaders of large compared to small terrorist groups and that these
small groups would somehow drive the main results. However, main results are robust to excluding
two groups which commit substantially fewer attacks, the Haqqani network and Harkat-ul-Jihad-
al-Islami (column 5).
Up to this point, the dependent variable in all regressions is an aggregation of all terrorist attacks
committed by a group globally. One might worry about the existence of region-time specific factors
(for instance holidays or other occasions which may be a target of terrorist groups) that could be
correlated to level of effort to hit leaders of groups active in these regions. One might have similar
worries about group-region specific factors, such as differential ability of groups to commit terrorist
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attacks in different regions. Therefore, the final three columns of Table B.4 re-estimates the baseline
model at the group-region-month level, distinguishing four regions (Western Europe, the US and
Australia, Asia, Middle East and North Africa). Models include region-fixed effects (column 6),
region-time fixed effects (column 7) and region-group fixed effects (column 8) respectively. Estimates
for these three models are extremely similar, as there is limited variation across regions between
groups (many groups commit terrorist attacks only in a single region) and limited variation over
time across regions (two regions do not experience any terrorist attacks in most time periods). In
all three models, the size of the coefficients decreases, as these now represent the impact of a drone
hit per month, group and region, and they are not individually statistically significant in columns
6 and 8. This loss in statistical significance follows exclusively from an increase in the size of the
standard errors, not from a decrease in coefficient size. As such, the loss of significance in those
columns is likely a result of introducing substantial noise into the dataset, rather than the fixed
effects capturing some omitted variable. Coefficients on lags of hit are individually and jointly
statistically significant in column 7.
Column 9 displays the results obtained when running specification 1 in the main text on an
expanded sample, adding all terrorist organizations that committed more than one terrorist attack
in Afghanistan or Pakistan over the research period. This specification employs HAC standard
errors, as adding these observations introduces strong heteroskedasticity. Results are very similar
to those presented in the main text.
B.6 Randomization inference
The empirical strategy in the main paper can be considered a quasi-experiment with a small number
of clusters (i.e. terrorist groups) and several treatment coefficients (i.e. lags of hit). Under these
circumstances, we may worry that either outliers or multiple testing can lead to false conclusions
regarding the statistical significance of the main results (Young, 2017). Furthermore, even though
the distribution of residuals from an OLS regression on the logged number of terrorist attacks
resembles the normal distribution (see Figure B.9), there may be lingering concerns about the OLS
assumption that residuals are normally distributed.
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To mitigate these concerns, I estimate standard errors by randomization inference. Within each
terrorist group, I re-allocate the logged number of terrorist attacks randomly to some other time
period and run specification 1 in the main text on the resulting dataset. Doing this repeatedly gives
an indication of how exceptional the coefficients making up the main results are in a universe of
10,000 possible random assignments of the outcome variable. Note that this determination can be
made on the basis of simulated coefficients alone, and does not require any assumption regarding
the distribution of standard errors.
Figure B.10 gives the distribution of simulated coefficients for each lag of hit, and the actual
coefficients from the main paper. The percentages in the white boxes reflect the percentage of
simulated coefficients that are larger than the actual coefficient, providing a simulated p-value.
The third and sixth lag of hit are statistically significant by this metric, albeit at a lower level of
significance for the sixth lag. The second lag of hit is narrowly no longer statistically significant at
conventional levels. Overall, results from estimating standard errors using randomization inference
are qualitatively similar to the main results.
B.7 Alternative numbers of leads and lags
Table B.5 illustrates that main results are not an artefact of choosing six as the particular number
of leads and lags of the variables of interest to include. The table gives the p-value for each lag
of hit in specification 1 in the main text, varying the number of leads and lags of all variables
included between four and fifteen. Coefficient estimates on most lags of hit are similar across the
nine models. The second and third lag of hit is statistically significant at the 5% level in each of
the twelve cases. The significance of the sixth lag of hit is somewhat sensitive to the number of
leads and lags included, but still statistically significant in six out of ten regressions in which it is
included. No coefficient on any lag of hit beyond the seventh is ever statistically significant.
B.8 Graph of results on infighting
Figure B.11 shows graphically the results on infighting presented in section 6.1 of the main text.
It shows that the leads of hit are strongly jointly statistically significant, but that this is driven
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Table B.5: p-values on lags of hit when varying number of leads and lags (L&L) included
# L&L t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9 t+10 t+11 t+12 t+13 t+14 t+15
4 .576 .048 .001 .353
5 .552 .032 .003 .415 .626
6 .277 .041 .005 .537 .614 .029
7 .299 .028 .006 .495 .449 .066 .32
8 .327 .023 .004 .272 .533 .125 .341 .253
9 .285 .017 .003 .24 .378 .137 .237 .335 .926
10 .242 .016 .004 .16 .418 .161 .215 .529 .957 .185
11 .541 .005 .005 .599 .343 .128 .195 .577 .911 .249 .282
12 .406 .008 .023 .543 .211 .09 .188 .577 .966 .271 .256 .434
13 .402 .019 .036 .657 .14 .045 .112 .582 .921 .335 .37 .424 .483
14 .576 .011 .023 .786 .138 .019 .031 .593 .973 .313 .346 .263 .378 .75
15 .756 .013 .017 .709 .153 .008 .03 .667 .796 .3 .67 .306 .381 .878 .567
This table displays the p-value for each lag of hit when varying the number of leads and lags of hit, target and
control variables between 4 and 15
by the first lead of hit. Closer examination reveals that this is not an artefact of a single outlier.
Therefore, results on infighting should be treated with some caution. However, there is no evidence
that trends in infighting differ between a hit and a miss prior to a drone strike for any other time
period.
C Affiliate groups
The effect of a drone strike killing the leader of a terrorist group may extend beyond the group itself,
to its affiliates30. With a few notable exceptions (i.e. Enders and Jindapon (2010) and Siqueira
and Sandler (2006)), few theoretical models cover the effect of counterterrorism against a group on
the group’s affiliates. Both existing models suggest that the effect on affiliates is ambiguous. As
such, this paper hopes to contribute to future theory development by providing empirical results
for the case of drone strikes.
30An affiliate is defined as a terrorist organization that has either (a) pledged fealty to the parent group and relies
on it for support or guidance; or (b) shares a similar ideology or goals and coordinates operations with the parent
group; (c) once operated under the same banner as the parent group and consolidated resources with the parent
(Crenshaw, 2012).
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C.1 Drone hits on parent groups and affiliate attacks
To investigate the impact of the death of a group’s leader on affiliated terrorist groups, I record
all affiliations, alliances and mergers involving the thirteen terrorist groups identified by Crenshaw
(2012), and locate the terrorist groups involved in the GTD. For the purpose of this paper, any
terrorist group that was ever affiliated, allied or merged with one of the thirteen groups is considered
an affiliate. Figure C.12 shows the distribution of affiliates for those terrorist organizations coded
as having any. Al-Qaida has the most affiliations, both in terms of the number of affiliates and the
number of attacks they commit, although most other terrorist organizations included in the dataset
have substantial affiliations as well.















γi,t−kXi,t−k + ψj,t−kXj,t−k + µj + θt + εjit
(2)
where Yjit represents the logged number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by group j affiliated to
parent group i. The coefficients of interest are the coefficients on the lags of hiti, which represent
the effect of a drone hit (compared to a miss) on the parent group on violence perpetrated by the
affiliate. As some groups are both parent group and affiliate, this specification controls for drone
misses and hits on the leaders of the affiliate groups. Similarly, six leads and lags of the number of
drone strikes targeted at both parent and affiliate (regardless of whether these targeted a leader)
are included as control variables. Inclusion of affiliate-group fixed effects (µj), makes including
parent-group fixed effects redundant.
Affiliates of a terrorist group commit an increasing number of terrorist attacks after a drone
strike that hit, compared to missed, the parent group’s leader. Table C.1 investigates the impact
of a drone hit on a terrorist group leader on terrorist attacks committed by other terrorist groups
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affiliated with the group struck. I present results at the group-month level (specification 1 in the
main text), and at the affiliate-month level, following specification 2 in this Appendix.
Table C.1: Effect of drone strikes on attacks by affiliates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Affil. att. Affil. att.
VARIABLES Affil. att. excl. AQ Affil. att. excl. ISIS
t 0.487* 0.283 0.151 0.0978
(0.272) (0.340) (0.103) (0.0913)
t+1 0.106 -0.194 0.0338 -0.0155
(0.279) (0.354) (0.104) (0.0920)
t+2 0.498* 0.370 0.0186 -0.0423
(0.274) (0.346) (0.104) (0.0921)
t+3 0.327 0.0105 0.213** 0.139
(0.273) (0.340) (0.106) (0.0937)
t+4 0.465* 0.250 0.189* 0.120
(0.280) (0.342) (0.108) (0.0956)
t+5 0.342 0.280 0.0138 -0.0548
(0.272) (0.336) (0.106) (0.0942)
t+6 0.608** 0.661* 0.163 0.0707
(0.273) (0.353) (0.102) (0.0906)
Observations 1,577 1,445 3,312 3,168
R-squared 0.857 0.830 0.657 0.706
Model Gr.-mnth Gr.-mnth Affil.-mnth Affil.-mnth
Group FE YES YES NO NO
Period FE YES YES YES YES
Affiliate FE NO NO YES YES
Prob > F lags hit 0.1798 0.1980
Prob > F leads hit 0.4739 0.6705
Prob > F lags targeted 0.6953 0.3656
Prob > F leads targeted 0.3860 0.4844
Control mean 3.1340 3.1340 0.5760 0.5497
Prob > F lags parent hit 0.0450 0.0903
Prob > F leads parent hit 0.7786 0.4320
Prob > F lags parent targeted 0.8416 0.9638
Prob > F leads parent targeted 0.9658 0.7308
Prob > F lags affil. hit 0.1297 0.0823
Prob > F leads affil. hit 0.2087 0.1173
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
Column 1 and 3 show that a drone hit on a parent group is associated with an increase in
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terrorist attacks by affiliates of that group. For the regression at the group-month level (column 1),
three coefficients on the lags of hit are individually statistically significant, although coefficients are
not jointly statistically significant. This effect is substantial in size: estimates in column 1 suggest
an increase in terrorist attacks by affiliates of between 59.2% and 83.7% for the months in which it
is significant. For reference, the mean number of terrorist attacks by affiliates per month in the six
months after a drone miss on the parent’s leader is approximately 23. There is no evidence that
drone strikes targeting but missing the parent group’s leader affect affiliates: coefficients on leads
and lags of targeted are jointly statistically insignificant.
These results at the group-month level are strongly influenced, but not exclusively driven, by
Al-Qaida, the terrorist group with the most affiliates. Column 2 of Table C.1 presents results
excluding Al-Qaida. Coefficients on hit are no longer jointly statistically significant and only the
coefficient on the sixth lag retains statistical significance, and that only at the 10% level.
Evidence at the affiliate-month level are somewhat stronger compared to those at the group-
month level. Estimates suggest that a drone hit on the parent group is associated with an increase
in terrorist attacks by affiliate groups in month three and four after the drone strike, and these
coefficients are jointly statistically significant (column 3). Results at the affiliate-month level are
markedly weakened by excluding Islamic State (ISIS) from the analysis (column 4), although coef-
ficients retain joint statistical significance at the 10% level.
C.2 Analysis by attack type
I proceed to analyze which type(s) of terrorist attacks drive the increase in affiliate group violence
after a drone hit on their parent group. The increase in terrorist attacks by affiliates, following a
drone strike killing the leader of their parent group, is driven by an increase in attack types across
the board.
Table C.2, showing results at the group-month level, and Table C.3, showing results at the
affiliate-month level, suggest that a drone hit is associate with an increase in terrorist attacks on
military, private, and civilian targets, and terrorist attacks with a US citizen killed our wounded.
I find some limited evidence that a drone hit on the parent group’s leader negatively affects
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affiliate capacity. Measuring capacity as the mean number of victims per terrorist attack, results
at the group-month level appear to suggest that affiliate capacity decreases in the fifth and sixth
month after a drone hit on the parent group’s leader (Table C.2, column 2). Coefficients are not
jointly statistically significant however, and the result is not reproduced at the affiliate-month level
(Table C.3, column 1). At the affiliate-month level, the percentage of ‘successful’ terrorist attacks by
affiliates appears to decrease following a drone hit on the parent group’s leader (Table C.3, column
1). This result is not reproduced at the group-month level, although coefficients are consistently
negative (Table C.2, column 1).
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Table C.2: Type of affiliate attack (group-month level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% mean
success # vics. Civilian Private Military US vic.
VARIABLES Affil.att. Affil.att. Affil.att. Affil.att. Affil.att. Affil.att.
t -0.0418 0.470** 0.484* 0.361 0.700*** 0.116
(0.0923) (0.206) (0.273) (0.255) (0.261) (0.0956)
t+1 -0.00269 -0.184 0.104 0.440* 0.333 0.365***
(0.0934) (0.207) (0.280) (0.261) (0.267) (0.0963)
t+2 -0.0566 -0.0144 0.480* 0.450* 0.546** 0.0972
(0.0924) (0.206) (0.275) (0.257) (0.263) (0.0956)
t+3 -0.0645 -0.198 0.324 0.111 0.755*** 0.258***
(0.0924) (0.206) (0.274) (0.256) (0.262) (0.0956)
t+4 0.00376 -0.260 0.550* 0.560** 0.919*** 0.0507
(0.0933) (0.207) (0.281) (0.262) (0.268) (0.0963)
t+5 -0.0335 -0.502** 0.360 0.375 0.478* 0.281***
(0.0914) (0.203) (0.273) (0.255) (0.261) (0.0945)
t+6 -0.0695 -0.411** 0.571** 0.587** 0.678*** 0.0210
(0.0932) (0.208) (0.273) (0.256) (0.262) (0.0968)
Observations 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,577 1,577
R-squared 0.770 0.682 0.853 0.788 0.788 0.510
Model Gr.-mnth Gr.-mnth Gr.-mnth Gr.-mnth Gr.-mnth Gr.-mnth
Group FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Prob > F lags hit 0.9589 0.1963 0.1961 0.0844 0.0184 0.0008
Prob > F leads hit 0.9534 0.7826 0.4140 0.7475 0.1441 0.0828
Prob > F lags targeted 0.9766 0.5147 0.8548 0.2920 0.3859 0.0406
Prob > F leads targeted 0.7522 0.8471 0.3792 0.5927 0.4531 0.1711
Control mean 0.8767 1.6992 3.0501 2.2180 1.8051 0.2608
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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Figure B.10: Results from randomization inference
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Table C.3: Type of affiliate attack (affiliate-month level)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% mean
success # vics. Civilian Private Military US vic.
VARIABLES Affil.att. Affil.att. Affil.att. Affil.att. Affil.att. Affil.att.
t 0.0410 0.920 0.151 0.144* 0.203** 0.0230
(0.0523) (0.858) (0.103) (0.0819) (0.0865) (0.0197)
t+1 0.0365 0.473 0.0324 0.107 0.0711 0.0576***
(0.0524) (0.857) (0.104) (0.0826) (0.0873) (0.0197)
t+2 -0.0956* 0.0176 0.0190 0.0693 0.101 0.0285
(0.0523) (0.854) (0.104) (0.0828) (0.0876) (0.0197)
t+3 0.0754 0.455 0.209** 0.0871 0.235*** 0.0498**
(0.0528) (0.856) (0.106) (0.0842) (0.0893) (0.0198)
t+4 0.0291 0.668 0.191* 0.178** 0.249*** 0.0172
(0.0532) (0.855) (0.108) (0.0860) (0.0915) (0.0199)
t+5 -0.0616 -1.185 0.0139 -0.0318 0.114 0.0392**
(0.0527) (0.852) (0.106) (0.0844) (0.0896) (0.0198)
t+6 0.0119 -1.011 0.163 0.0943 0.183** -0.00361
(0.0515) (0.842) (0.102) (0.0811) (0.0859) (0.0195)
Observations 3,312 3,312 3,312 3,312 3,312 3,312
R-squared 0.467 0.139 0.657 0.577 0.577 0.319
Model Affil.-mnth Affil.-mnth Affil.-mnth Affil.-mnth Affil.-mnth Affil.-mnth
Group FE NO NO NO NO NO NO
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Affiliate FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Prob > F lags parent hit 0.0413 0.5644 0.0481 0.0538 0.0460 0.0208
Prob > F leads parent hit 0.6253 0.2528 0.7850 0.6395 0.2475 0.5667
Prob > F lags parent targeted 0.5585 0.8313 0.8492 0.9861 0.8496 0.2144
Prob > F leads parent targeted 0.5551 0.1737 0.9660 0.6657 0.9356 0.9555
Prob > F lags affil. hit 0.9465 0.5066 0.1303 0.3564 0.0074 0.0010
Prob > F leads affil. hit 0.4157 0.9228 0.2097 0.1745 0.1357 0.0084
Control mean 0.2890 1.8059 0.5755 0.3452 0.3066 0.0219
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
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